New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1978
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons,
Constitutional Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 58. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
BENCH -MEMORANDUM 
RE: New ·York -city Transit Authority v. Beazer, No. 77-1427 
DATE: November 28, 1978 
This case presents the question whether the Transit 
Authority violates the equal protection clause when it refuses to 
employ in any capacity persons who have been on methadone 
maintenance for a year or more. The district court also found 
that this policy violates Title VII because of its 
disproportionate impact on blacks and Puerto Ricans. The Second 
Circuit did not address this second issue, however, and it 
probably would be best not to reach it here. 
l' 
t 
. •. ~ 
~~ 
As, it seems, in every case I am working on this month, 
there is a suggestion that the grant of certiorari was 
improvident. Respondent argues that recent amendments to federal --legislation involving discrimination against the handicapped will 
~--------~----------~--------~- --
govern this case. We do not know whether President Carter has 
signed these admendments into law, although I hope to run this 
/ down before argument. Under these amendments, employers will be 
\ forbidden from discriminating against former addicts. These 
amendments might deal with the underlying issue in this case, 
although there is at least some question about that (e~g~, Can 
. ----
this legislation be applied to municipalities in light of 
National Leaque ·of ·cities? Is a present methadone addict a 
"former addict"?). In any event, the scope of relief against the 
city will be substantially different if the lower court's ruling 
is allowed to stand: every drug addict ever denied employment by 
the Transit Authority will have a potential § 1983 suit against fo ~ tJL the TA under the present ruling, while the federal amendments 
will be ~respective only. Finally, the decision of the court 
~ v{;' below strikes me as bad precedent that should be reversed. For 
~ ~ these reasons, I think this Court should not dismiss the writ. 
~ Getting to the merits, I note at the outset that the 
~riefs on both sides take liberties with the opinions of the 
~ Vf urts below and the record. Petitioner dwells on statistics 
to do with recidivism among initial participants in 
methadone maintenance programs. These statistics are irrelevant, 
however, as the district court indicated the TA could require a 
one-year maintenance period to screen out potential recidivists. 
,_ ~ 
Respondents for their part depreciate the administrative and 
other difficulties that a one-year ' rule would entail. Simply 
determining which patients had "successfully" passed a one-year 
heroin-free period, for example, would involve perhaps 
unwarranted reliance on the clinics' own policing efforts. 
Other, similar problems are assumed away. 
~ 
~ I do not see how the TA's employment policy can be said 
~~ to lack a rational basis, no matter how unfair or ungenerous it 
~ may seem. The district court purported to apply a "rational 
~ relation" standard of review, but its opinion relie~ heavily on a 
"less restrictive means" analysis. The court did not dispute 
seriously that participation in a methadone program i~n 
indicium of personal instability, unreliability, and potential 
future heroin abuse--
I I \ ~ 
in short, unemployability-- but it did 
regard as essential the fact that many people who fall in this 
class are employable and that the TA, by making some efforts, 
could distinguish which are which. The court depreciated the 
administrative problems such further screening would entail and 
seemed to regard as unfounded the TA's unwillingness to rely on 
the clinics, which have a vested interest in finding jobs for 
their patients. The court seemed to have missed the point that 
the Constitution does not require the TA to shoulder these extra 
~'------------------'---------------~,--------------------~---------burdens, unless some level of scrutiny greater than "rational 
basis" applies. No one argues that a greater level should apply 
here. Accordingly, I think the district court misapplied the 
"rational basis" analysis. 
The Second Circuit rubberstamped the district court's 
""'• 
equal protection argument. Unlike the district court, however, 
it did not reach the Title VII issue, as the sole basis for 
reaching Title VII-- attorneys fees-- was mooted by the 
enactment of the 1976 Fees Award Act. The Title VII issue 
presents some tricky questions here. Petitioners argue that 
inasmuch as Title VII rests on Congress' enforcement authority 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it does when applied to 
states and their subdivisions, it must incorporate the 
constitutional requirement of purposeful discriminaton. Compare 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 445 (1976), with National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976). There also is a 
question of whether Title VII prohibits the isolated use of an 
employment standard that has a discriminatory impact, where the 
emplyer's overall hiring program favors minorities. Finally, it 
might be possible for the TA to introduce evidence showing that 
its refusal to employ methadone maintenance patients has no 
greater discriminatory impact than its broader policy of not 
employing any past or present narcotics users. In light of these 
problems, I recommend deciding only the equal protection issue 
and not reaching the Title VII question. 
SUPPLMENTAL "BENCH "MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: N~w · York · city · Transit · Authority v. B~az~r, No. 77-1427 
DATE: December 7, 1978 
I have reviewed the district court's opinion with an eye 
to highlighting inconsistencies between its ultimate and 
subsidiary findings of fact. I continue to believe the most 
important inconsistency in the case lies in the court's holding 
on the one hand that "there are substantial numbers of persons on 
methadone maintenance who are as fit for employment as other 
comparable sources" (pet. app. 19a) and on the other hand that 
the TA may forbid "methadone maintained persons employment in 
sensitive categories such as that of subway motorman, subway 
conductor, subway towerman, bus driver, and jobs dealing with 
high voltage equipment." (pet. app. 67a) If methadone maintained 
persons were as · fit as others, the latter exclusion also would 
lack a rational basis. The district court, however, upheld this 
purportedly irrational rule. 
Also significant is the fact that the district court at 
no time ruled that all methadone patients were employable. 
Throughout the opinion, the court qualifies its finding with the 
statement that "substantial numbers" are employable. See, e~g~, 
pet. app. 19a, 41a-42a, 46a. The negative pregnant of this 
finding is also true: A substantial number of methadone patients 
are not employable. The evidence cited in the opinion is 
illustrative: 38 % of the City patients are unemployed, 65 % of 
the ARTC patients, 20 % of the DACC patients. One study showed 
that the ranged of figures for gainful employment of patients who 
had been treated for at least a year ran from 63 % to 34 %. (pet. 
app. 41a-42a) This would mean that among the class of patients 
which the court ordered the TA to consider for employment, 
anywhere from one- to two-thirds are unemployed and, it is fair 
to presume, unemployable. 
The district court did not dispute that a substantial 
number of methadone patients should not be employed by the TA in 
any position. What it held was that it was irrational of the TA 
not to try to identify which patients were employable. It noted 
that the TA hires from other "problem" categories-- former 
criminals, tranquilizer users, former mental patients, and 
sufferers of diabetes, epilepsy, or heart disease.(pet. app. 
47a). For applicants or employees'in each of these categories, 
the TA consulted its own staff, physicians, psychiatrists, and 
other sources to determine whether an individual was employable. 
(pet. app. 46a) Similarly, the court held, the TA could use 
participation in a reliable methadone program, compliance with 
the rules of such programs, monitoring of drug use by such 
programs, education, family ties, and employment record as 
criteria for identifying employable methadone patients. (pet app. 
48a) 
I think there are two fundamental flaws with this 
approach. First, the criteria for culling out the unemployables 
~
depend, to a significant degree, in the effectiveness of the 
methadone programs in monitoring treatment. The first three of 
the criteria listed by the court, which seem by far the most 
important factors, depend entirely on the clinics. The district 
court adverted to this concern, and ruled that, although some 
evidence existed as to the reliability of some programs, the TA 
never had tried to evaluate the reliability of any program. (pet. 
app. 50a). This, to me, seems to miss the whole point. TheTA 
is entitled to be wary. The Constitution does not compell the TA 
to experiment with different clinics, learning by hard experience 
which are not to be trusted. As long as a legitimate concern 
exists, and the district court did not find that reliability was 
not a proper concern, the TA is not behaving irrationally when it 
decides not to run the risk. 
Second, the rational basis branch of the equal 
protection clause does not compel an employer who takes on 
certain risks-- ex-cons, former mental patients, and the like---
to take on all comers. The following language from Williamson v. 
Lee · optical·co~, 348 u.s! 483, 489 (1955), is appropriate here: 
"The problem of legislative classification is a 
perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire 
definition. Evils in the same field may be of 
different dimensions and proportions, requiring 
different remedies. Or so the legislature may 
think. • . . Or the reform may take one step at a 
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
which seems most acute to the legislative mind. 
The legislature may select one phase of one 
field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the 
others. • • • The prohibition of the Equal 
Protection Clause goes no further than the 
invidious discrimination." (citations omitted) 
I appreciate your concern that "rational basis" equal 
protection analysis not be entirely toothless, or that this 
languaqe from Lee ·optical might itself be "overbroad". But I do 
believe that the point is applicable here: the Constitution does 
not require the TA to take on the same problems with methadone 
patients that it voluntarily has taken on with ex-cons and the 
==·=~ 
l .!Js.; . First, it may h ave '7nouqh headaches already, and may be 
unwilling to open up yet another set of problems with a different 
category of employees. Second, over the years the TA may have 
developed a degree of familiarity with parole agencies, mental 
hospitals, doctors, and other outsiders whom it now feels it can 
trust. This contrasts with the TA's conceded lack of experience 
with methadone clinics. 
The reference to Lee ·optical touches on what I perceive 
to be the underlying problem in this case: the meaning of the 
rational basis standard. My bench memorandum neglected to point 
out that the district court, as well as the court of appeals, 
neglected to refer to any rational'basis cases of this Court. 
All of the precedent relied on below involved heightened scrutiny 
in one form or another. Thus the courts, although articulating a 
rational basis test, imbued the term with a meaning this Court 
has not yet given it. 
I also include an excerpt from Justice Marshall's 
plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 u.s. 514 (1968). The 
facts here are quite different: that case involved alcoholism, 
while this involves narcotics, and plaintiffs here introduced 
considerably more evidence about the medical issues in the case. 
I think, however, that the approach taken by Justice Marshall has 
some relevance to this case, inasmuch as it stresses the 
difficulties of attempting to "prove" in a court of law the 
answers to essentially unanswerable medical and scientific 
questions. I believe the court below was guilty of the same 
vice. I note two things about the evidence relied on below. As 
methadone was not used as a treatment for narcotics addiction 
until 1963, all of what we know about methadone is fairly recent, 
cfc.t·o..rr· 2..r4.) 
and none of it involves long-term effects. Second, with one 
" exception all of the witnesses cited in the district court's 
opinion (and these were, I believe, the so-called independent 
experts that the district court obtained on its own initiatives) 
were persons who ran or promoted methadone programs and had a 
vested interest in portraying them as successful. The one 
witness from Phoenix House, a non-methadone program, criticized 
the efficacy of methadone treatment, but the district court 
ignored or depreciated the criticisms. 
In sum, I am not at all s~re the "evidence" presented in 
this case was all that superior to the evidence introduced in 
Powell. Of course, the obligation to point this out is in the 
first instance the TA's, and it has not met its obligation here. 
But this is a constitutional case, and I am not sure this Court 
should allow important questions of constitutional interpretation 
to turn entirely on the failure of one party to muster all of the 
evidence that supports its position, at least in an area where 
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Following this abbreviated exposition of the problem 
before it, the trial court indicated its intention to dis-
allow appellant's claimed defense of "chronic alcoholism." 
Thereupon defense counsel submi-tted, and the trial court 
entered, the following "findings of fact": 
" ( 1) That chronic alcoholism is a disease " ·hich 
destroys the afflicted person's will power to resist 
the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol. 
"(2) That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in 
public by his own volition but under a compulsion 
symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism. 
"(3) That Leroy Po"·ell, defendant herein, is a 
chronic alcoholic who is afflicted with the disease of 
chronic alcoholism." 
Whatever else may be said of them, those are not 
"findings of fact" in any recogniznble, traditional sense 
in which that term has been used in a court of law; 
they are the premises of a syllogism transparently de-
signed to bring this case within the scope of this Court's 
opinion in Robin son v. California, 370 U. S. GGO (1962). 
Nonetheless, the dissent \\·ould have us adopt these "find-
ings" without critical examination; it would use them as 
the basis for a constitutional holding that "a person may 
not be punished if the condition essential to constitute 
the defined crime is part of the pattern of his di sease and 
is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the 
disease." Post, at 569. 
The difficulty with that position, as \Ve shall show, is 
that it goes much too far on the basis of too little knowl-
edge. In the first place, the record in this case is utte~ 
in adequate to permit the sort of informed and respon-: 
sible adjudication which alone cnn support the announce-~ 
ment of an important and wide-ranging new con:~ 
stitutional principle. We know very little about the 
circumstances surrounding the drinking bout which re-
... , ·' 
.· •, 
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suited in this conviction, or about Ler..oy Powell's drinking 
problem, or indeed about alcoholism itself. The trial 
hardly reflects the sharp legal and evidentiary clash be-
tween fully prepared adversary litigants which is tra-
ditionally expected in major constitutional cases. The 
State put on only one witness, the arresting officer. The 
defense put on three--a policeman who testified to appel-
lant's long history of arrests for public drunkenness, the 
psychiatrist, and appellant himself. 
/ Furthermore, the inescapable fact is that there is no 
." · agreement among members of the medical profession 
; ! about what it means to say that "alcoholism" is a "dis-
case." One of the principal works in this field states 
that the major difficulty in articulating a "disease concept 
of alcoholism" is that "alcoholism has too many defini-
tions and disease has practically none." 2 This same 
author concludes that "a d1:sease is what the 1nedical pro-
fession recognizes as such." 8 In other words, there is 
widespread agreement today that "alcoholism" is a "dis-
ease," for the simple reason that the medical profession 
has concluded that it should attempt to treat those who 
have drinking problems. There the agreement stops. 
Debate rages within the medical profession as to whether 
"alcoholism" is a separate "disease" in any meaningful 
biochemical, physiological or psychological sense, or 
whether it represents one peculiar manifestation in some 
individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders. 4 
Nor is there any substantial consensus as to the "mani-
festations of alcoholism." E. M. Jellinek, one of the 
outstanding authorities on the subject, identifies five 
2 E. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism l1 (1960). 
"!d., at 12 (emphasis in original). 
4 See, e. g., Joint Information Scrv. of the Am. Psychiatric Assn. & 
the Nat. Assn. for Mental Health, The Treatment of Alcoholi sm- A 
Study of Programs and Problems 6-8 (1967) (hereafter cited as 
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different types of alcoholics which, predominate m the 
United States, and these types display a broad range 
of different and occasionally inconsistent symptoms.6 
Moreover, wholly distinct types, relatively rare in this 
country, predominate in natim1s with different cultural 
attitudes regarding the consumption of alcohoJ.G Even 
if we limit our consideration to the range of alcoholic 
symptoms more typically found in this country, there 
is substantial disagreement as to the manifestations of 
the ''disease" called "alcoholism." Jellinek, for example, 
considers that only two of his five alcoholic types can 
truly be said to be suffering from "alcoholism" as a 
"disease," because only these two types attain what 
he believes to be the requisite degree of physiological 
dependence on alcohoJ.7 He applies the label "gamma 
alcoholism" to "that species of alcoholism in which 
(1) acquired increased tissue tolerance to alcohol, (2) 
adaptive cell metabolism ... , (3) withdrawal symptoms 
and 'craving,' i. e., physical dependence, and ( 4) loss 
of control are involved." 8 A "delta" alcoholic, on the 
other hand, "sho·ws the first three characteristics of 
gamma alcoholism as well as a less marked form of the 
fourth characteristic-that is, instead of loss of control 
5 Jellinek, supra, n. 2, at 35-41. 
6 For example, in naiions where large quantJt1es of wine are 
customarily consumed with meals, apparently there arc many people 
who are completely unaware that they have a "drinking problem"-
they rarely if ever ~how signs of intoxication, they display no 
marked symptoms of behavioral disorder, and are entirely capable 
of limiting their alcoholic intake to a reasonable amount-and yet 
who display severe withdrawal symptoms,. sometimes including de-
lirimn trcmrns, \Yhen deprived of their daily portion of "·ine. M. 
Block, Alcoholism-Its Facets and Phases 27 (1965); Jellinek, supra, 
n. 2, at 17. See generally id., at 13-32. 
7 Jellinek, su.pra, n. 2, at 40. 
8 Jellinek, supra, n. 2, at 37. 
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there is inability to abstain." 9 Other authorities ap-
proach the problems of classification in an entirely dif-
ferent manner and, taking account of the large role which 
psycho-social factors seem to play in "problem drinking," 
define the "disease" in terms of the earliest identifiable 
manifestations of any sort of abnormality in drinking 
patterns.10 
Dr. \Vade appears to have testified about appellant's 
"chronic alcoholism" in terms similar to Jellinek's 
"gamma" and "delta" tnJes, for these types are largely 
defined, in their later stages, in terms of a strong com-
pulsion to drink, physiological dependence and an ina-
bility to abstain from drinking. No attempt IYas made 
in the court below, of course, to determine whether Leroy 
Powell could in fact properly be diagnosed as a "gamma" 
or "delta" alcoholic in Jellinek's terms. The focus at 
. the trial, and in the dissent here, has been exclusively 
, upon the factors of loss of control and inability to abstain. 
Assuming that it makes sense to compartmentalize in 
this manner the diagnosis of such a formless "disease," 
tremendous gaps in our knowledge remain, which the 
record in this case does nothing to fill. 
The trial court's "finding" that Powell "is afflicted with 
the disease of chronic alcoholism," which "destroys the 
afflicted person's will power to resist the constant, exces-
sive consun1ption of alcohol" covers a multitude of sins. 
Dr. vVadc's testimony that appellant suffered from a com-
pulsion which was an "exceedingly strong influence," but 
which was "not completely overpowering" is at least more 
carefully stated, if no less mystifying. Jellinek insists 
that conceptual clarity can only be achieved by distin-
guishing carefully between "loss of control" once an indi-
vidual has commenced to drink and "inability to abstain" 
9 !d., at 38. 
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from drinking in the first place.11 Presumably a person 
would have to display both characteristics in order to 
make out a constitutional defense; should one be recog-
nized. Yet the "findings" of the trial court utterly fail to~ 
make this crucial distinction, Rlld there is serious question 
whether the record can be read to support a finding ofj 
either loss of control or inability to abstain. 
Dr. Wade did testify that once appellant began drink-
ing he appeared to have no control over the amount of 
alcohol he finally ingested. Appellant's own testimony 
concerning his drinking on the day of the trial would 
certainly appear, however, to cast doubt upon the con-
clusion that he was without control over his consumption 
of alcohol when he had sufficiently important reasons to 
exercise such control. Ho,Yever that may be, there are 
more serious factual and conceptual difficulties with 
reading this record to show that appellant was unable to 
abstain from drinking. Dr. Wade testified that when 
appellant was sober, the act of taking the first drink was 
a "voluntary exercise of his will," but that this exercise 
of will was undertaken under the "exceedingly strong 
influence" of a "compulsion" which was "not completely 
overpowering." Such concepts, when juxtaposed in this 
fashion, have little meaning. 
Moreover, Jellinek asserts that it cannot accurately 
be said that a person is truly unable to abstain from 
drinking unless he is suffering the physical symptoms of 
withdra.wal.' 2 There is no testimony in this record that 
Leroy Powell underwent withdrawal symptoms either 
before he began the drinking spree which resulted in the 
conviction under review here, or at any other time. In 
attempting to deal with the al coholic's desire for drink 
in the absence of withdrawal symptoms, Jellinek is re-
11 Jellinck, supra, n. 2, at 41-42. 
12 I d., at 43. 
·, 
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duced to unintelligible distinctions between a "compul-
sion" (a "psychopathological phenomenon" which can 
apparently serve in some instances as the functional 
equivalent of a "craving" or symptom of wi~hdrawal) 
and an "impulse" (something which differs from a loss 
of control, a craving or a compulsion, and to which 
Jellinek attributes the start of a new drinking bout for 
a "gamma" alcoholic).13 Other scholars are equally 
unhelpful in articulating the nature of a "compulsion." 14 
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of 
alcohol his hands will begin to shake, he will suffer ago-
nizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; 
~it is quite another to say that a man has a "compulsion" 
to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain amount 
;of "free will" with which to resist. It is simply impos-
:,sible, in the present state of our knowledge, to ascribe 
~ useful meaning to the latter statement. This defini-
tional confusion reflects, of course, not merely the unde-
veloped state of the psychiatric art but also the con-
ceptual difficulties inevitably attendant upon the impor-
tation of scientific and medical models· into a legal 
system generally predicated upon a different set of 
assumptions.15 
II. 
Despite the comparatively primitive state of our 
knowledge on the subject, it cannot be denied that the 
destructive use of alcoholic beYerages is one of our prin-
13 I d., at 41-44. 
Dr. Wade did not clarify matters when he testified at trial that 
a chronic alcoholic suffers from "the same type of compulsion" as 
a "compulsive eater." 
14 See, e. g., Block, supra, n. 6, at 40, 55, 308; Treatment of 
Alcoholism 6-8; Note, Alcoholism, Public Intoxication :rnd the Law, 
2 Col. J. Law & Soc. Prob. 109, 112- 114 (1966). 
15 See Washington v. United St(Jtes, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 
---, 390 F. 2d 444, 446-456 (1967). 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, No. 77-1427 
I am disturbed by several things in Justice Stevens' 
opinion. To take the most important first, the opinion at 2-3, 
n. 3, attempts to portray this case as involving a ban against 
current methadone users only. A large part of his subsequent 
analysis hinges on this point. See p. 19 & n. 34. Yet the 
record is clear that the TA would not hire persons with a history 
of methadone use, apart from any present use. The TA's answer 
admitted that it does "not employ persons who use or have a 
history of using narcotic drugs, including methadone." App. 60A. 
2. 
The TA's brief summarizes testimony by one of its officials 
indicating that the TA would not consider an applicant until he 
had been free of methadone use for over five years. Brief of 
Petitioners 5. Further, the district court found that, "It is 
clear that a relatively recent methadone user would be subject to 
the blanket exclusionary policy." Pet. App. 18a. That paragraph 
goes on to say that the only "unclarity" with respect to this 
policy is whether applicants will be considered after five years 
of freedom from methadone use. There is no dispute that until an 
applicant or employee has been free of use for at least five 
years, he comes within the TA's policy. 
What Justice Stevens may mean to say is that none of the 
named plaintiffs had standing to attack the policy except as it 
applied to current users. Beazer, however, ceased using 
methadone in November 1973, and Frasier quit in March 1973. 
Beazer was fired while he was still on methadone, while Frasier 
was denied employment once while he was on methadone, and again a 
month after he had quit. Both presumably were ready and willing 
to reapply for TA jobs at the time the district court entered its 
order in August 1975; otherwise I do not see how they had 
standing to obtain any prospective relief. By that date both had 
been off heroin for over a year but, under the conceded terms of 
TA's policy, would not be considered for employment. I do not 
see why, under these facts, Beazer ~nd Frasier would have to 
reapply and get turned down in order to have standing to attack 
the exclusionary policy with respect to former methadone users. 
In short, I think Justice Stevens has ducked the hard 
3. 
question presented by this case: To what extent may the TA, 
consistently with the equal protection clause, deny employment to 
persons who once used methadone, but currently are free of all 
drug use. Furthermore, I .think the means Justice Stevens has 
used to duck that question cannot be sustained on this record. 
Footnotes 23 and 24 on pages 13 and 14 ~ present 
problems. In note 23 he says white methadone users "presumably 
do not have standing in this case under Title VII or§ 1981". I 
am not sure this is incorrect, but I would like to know why. It 
may be that he means that the policy does not have a 
discriminatory impact on whites, and that both Title VII and § 
1981 prohibit only racially based discrimination. I think it 
would be better if he said that. More troubling is his treatment 
of the County of Los Angeles v. Davis issue in these footnotes. 
What he seems to be saying is that it is unnecessary in this case 
to decide whether § 1981 requires proof of purposeful 
discrimination. But the language he chose is ambiguous, and 
could be read as implying § 1981 does not require anything more 
than Title VII in the way of a prima facie case. 
I do not recall that the conference discussion went to 
the Title VII issue, and I am surprised he went to its merits. I 
do not question the result, but I would like to reread what he 
says on this point. 
Some of these problems can be taken care of with some 
simple language changes. The more fundamental point- whether 
exclusion of past users is in this case- probably will present 
greater problems. If the Court accepts Justice Stevens' 
4. 
analysis, I suggest that you consider writing separately. 
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~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77-1427 
New York City Transit Authority)On Writ of Certiorari to 
et al., Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Sec-
Carl A. Beazer et al. ond Circuit. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The New York Transit Authority refuses to employ persons 
who use methadone. The District Court found that this 
policy violates the Equal Protf'ction Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In a subsequent opinion, the court also held 
that the policy violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. The Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the 
statutory question. The departure by those courts from the 
procedure normally followed in addressing statutory and con-
stitutional questions in the same case, as well as concern that 
the merits of these important questions had been decided 
erroneously, led us to grallt certiorari.1 - U. S. - . We 
now reverse. 
1 Rule 19 of thr Hult-1-1 of tlw Supn·me Court provides : 
·'CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW ON CERTIORARI 
"1. A review ou writ of et-rtioran i~ not a matter of right, but of sound 
judicial diserrtion, and will lw granted onl~· whf're thrn· arr i:iJWCial nnd 
important rrason~ thrrrfor. Thr following, whilr neithrr controlling nor 
fully lll(':tsuring the court ·~ di~<·rrtion, indrcate the charactrr of rm:,om 
whieh will lJe ('(lll~ider<'d : 
, . (h) Wlwr·r a court of apprab . .. lm,; decidrd a fedrral qurstion in a 
way m conflict with apJllicable d!'cisioni:i of thi~ court; or has so far de-
partrd from the aceeptrd a11d uswd com~e of jndieial proerrdings, or so 
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The Tra11sit Authority (TA) operates the subway system 
and certain bus lines i11 New York City. It employs about 
47,000 persons, of whom many-perhaps most-are employed 
in positions that involve danger to themselves or to the public. 
For exan'lple, some 12,300 are subway motormen, towermen, 
conductors, or bus operators. The District Court found that 
these jobs are attended by unusual hazards and must be per-
formed by ''persons of maximmn alertness and competence.'~ 
399 F. Rupp. 1033, 1052. Certai11 other jobs. such as oper-
ating cranes and handling high voltage equipment, are also 
considered "critical." or "sa.fety sensitive," while still others,. 
though classified as "non-critical.'' have a potentially impor-
tant impact on the overall operation of the transportation 
system.2 
TA enforces a general policy against employing persons 
who use narcotic drugs. The policy is reflected in Rule 11 (b) 
of TA's Rules and Regulations. 
"Employees must not use. or have in their possession, 
narcotics, tranquilizers, drugs of the Amphetamine group 
or barbiturate derivatives or paraphernalia used to ad-
minister narcotics or barbiturate derivatives, except with 
the written permission of the Medical Director-Chief 
Surgeon of the System." 
Methadone is regarded as a narcotic within the meaning of 
Rule 11 (b). No written permission has ever been given by 
T A's Medical Director for the employment of a person using 
methadone} 
far :-;anrtionrd such n departure by a lower court, as to call for an exer-
cis<> of thiH court'~ ~up<:'rviHion ." 
2 Thns, about 13 ,400 emplo:VP<'S arc involved in the maintenance of 
~mbway carR, hui'iE'H, trnck, tunnrb, :mel structurrs. Another 5,600 work in 
subway ~tations, and owr 2,000 arc eng:1ged in office ta~ks that ineludf~ · 
the handling of large HUm~ of money. TA hire~ about :3,000 new employees 
<:'aeh year. 
8 By ihi tt•rms, Hule 11 (h) dOP~ not apply to per~ons who formerly · 
u~ed mt:thadone or. any other d1·ug, and _ thr Di~trict Court did not find· 
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The District Court found that methadone is a synthetic 
narcotic and a central nervous system depressant. If injected 
into the blood stream with a needle, it produces essentially 
the same effects as heroin. 1 Methadone has been used legiti-
mately in at least three ways-as a pain killer, in "detoxifica-
that TA had any gf'l1t>ral polic)' covering former users. On the contrary, 
the court found that "It I he :situation is not <'Titirely clear with respect to 
the policy of the TA regarding per:;on~ who have successfully concluded 
participation in n methadone program." 399 F. Supp., at 1036. 
Although it did not :;rttle the quP:,;1ion of what policy TA enforces in 
this m:;pect, the Di;;trict Conrt included former users in the plaintiff 
claHS. It thrn afford('cl thrm rrlwf from any blanket exrln;;ionary policy 
that TA might rnforcr, although, again, the ;;upporting factual findings 
were admittrdly " not Lba;;ed on] a grrat deal" of evidence. !d., at 1051. 
TA contrnd~ that thr meager evidrncr rrcrivrd at trial on the " former 
u;;rr:s" i~sur wa:s in:sufficirnt to support eithrr the clas;; or rrlirf determina-
tion~ made with rr:;prct to thos<' persom:1 . Wf.' go further. As far as we 
are aware there wa:; no rvidruce offf.'rrcl at trial, and certainly nonf.' rrlied 
upon by thr Di;;trict Court, that TA actually rrfu:::~rcl employmrnt to any 
former user entitl<>cl to rrlirf under the injunction ordf.'red by that court. 
(The one namt'd plaintiff who wa~ a former user had not completed a full 
year of methadone maintPnHIH'e and could therefore be excluded under the 
lujunctiou .) 
It follow~ that neither tlH' finding~ of fact, nor thP record evidence, 
squarely presents any issuf' with respPct to former user8 that must be 
re:;olvrd in ordPr to di:;po:;e of this litigation. A policy excluding all 
former uRPrs would be hardrr to ju~tify than a policy applicable only to 
person:; currrntly receiving trratmpnt. A court should not reach out to 
expre:::~s an opimon on thP con~titutionality of such a policy unless necessary 
to adjudiCatf' a concn•te dispute betwren adven;r litigants. We shall there-
fore confinr our consideration to the legality of TA's enforcement of its 
l{ulr 11 (b) again~t rurreut UHf'r~ of mrthadone. 
·1 '·Hrroin i;; a narcotie which i~ genPrally injected into tl1f' bloodstream 
by a JwedlP. It i~ a crntral nervouH systPm depre~Si::iant. Thr usual rffect 
i~ to c·rratP n ' high'-Puphorin, drowsme:::~s-for about thirty minutE's, which 
then taprr~ off ovPr a penod of about threr or four hour~. At thr end of 
t hi~ tim<> t hP hermn u~er rxpPnf'nee~ ~rckne::;s and di:scomfort known as 
'wrthdrawal ":vmptom~.' There i" intt'n:;e cravmg for anothf.'r ~hot of 
heroin, after winch thr cyclP ,.;iarts over again. A typical addict will inject 
heroin J:;f'V('fll[ tunes a day." a99 F. Hupp., at was. 
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tion units" of hospitals as an immediate means of taking· 
addicts off of heroin," and in long range "methadone mainte-
nance programs" as part of a permanent cure for heroin 
addiction. See 21 CFR ~ 310.304 (b) (1978). In such pro-
grams the methadone is taken orally in regula.r doses for a 
prolonged period. As so administered. it does not produce 
euphoria or any pleasurable effects associated with heroin; on 
the contrary, it prPvents users from experiencing those effects 
when they injrct heroin, and also alleviates the severe and 
prolonged discomfort otherwise associated with an addict's 
discontinuance of the usP of heroin. 
About 40,000 persons rpceive methadone maintenance treat-
ment in New York City, of whom about 26,000 participate 
in the five major public or semi-public programs,0 and 14,000 
are involved in about 25 private programs.' The sole purpose 
" TlH' Di~triet Comt found that detoxifieation is arcompli::;hed "by 
switching n hE'roin addH:t to mrthadonr and gradually reducing thE' do::;es 
of ml'thndonr to zrro ovrr a prriod of about threE' weE'ks. The patiE'nt 
thu~ drtoxifiPd i~ drug frrP. :\1orpover, it i~ hoprd that the program of 
graduall~· redueed do~rs of mrthadonr leavE':; him without thr withdrawal 
~ympto11". or thr 'phy:;ieal drp('l)denee' on :t narcotic." 399 F . Supp., at 
10:38. 
0 ''The five major public• or srmi-public methadone maintenance pro-
gram~ 1ll Xew York City arr : 
" (1) Brth l srarl program ... with :1:3 clinic!' treating 7100 patients ; 
' '(2) A program admim~tPred hy tllf' City of New York with :39 clinic~ 
treatmg 12 ,400 patirnt~ (herpaftE'r referred to as ' the City program') ; 
" (3) A program ndmini::>tPrrd by thr Bronx State Hospital and the Albert 
Einstrin Collt>~~:r of l\IE'dicinr, with 7 clinic~ treating about 2400 patirnt~; 
" (4) A program opE'rated b~· tlJP Addiction He~earch and TrE'atmE'nt CE'n-
tc>r (AHTC) with 6 clinic~ trrating ahout 1200 patiE'nts; and 
" (5) A program OJwrHtrd hy the 'XE'w York StatE' Drug Abuse Control 
Conllm~~ion (DACC). with ~ rlimc~ trPating about 1100 patients. 
''Thr total HumbC'r of patiPnt~ trrated in public or ~cmi-public programs 
i:-; about :W,OOO. Il apprar~ that thrsr program:; arr financed almo::;t 
entirE'])· b~· !'C'drral, statr nnd rtt~· fund~." 399 F. Supp., at 1040. 
'·· 1_v jpry 1Lt11C' ~JWritic information wa~ providrd rat trial] regarding-
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of all these programs is to cure the addiction of persons who 
have been using heroin for at least two years. 
Methadone maintenance treatment in New York is largely 
governed by regulations promulgated by the New York Drug 
Abuse Control Commission. Under the regulations, the newly 
accepted addict must first be detoxified, normally in a hospital. 
A controlled daily dosage of methadone is then prescribed. 
The regulations require that six doses a week be administered 
at a clinic, while the seventh day's dose may be taken at 
home. If progress is satisfactory for three months, additional 
doses may be taken away from the clinic, although through-
out most of the program. which often lasts for several years, 
there is a minimum requiremeut of three clinic appearances a 
week. During these visits, the patient not only receives his 
doses but is also counseled and tested for illicit use of drugs.8 
The evidence indicates that methadone is an eft'ective cure 
for the physical aspects of heroin addiction. But the District 
Court also found "that many persons attempting to overcome 
the private clinics." 399 F. Supp., at 1046. What evid!:'nce there was 
indicated that thosE' clinics WE're lik!:'ly to bE' IE'sS successful and less able 
to provide accurate information about their clients than the public clinics. 
/d., at 1046, 1050. 
8 Although the Unit!:'d States Food and Drug Administration h11s also 
is::;u!:'d r!:'gulations in this area, 21 CFR §§ 291.501, 291.505 (1978), the 
New York State regulations are as or morE' :stringE'nt and thus effectively 
set thE' rel!:'vant standards for the authorized methadone maintenance pro-
gram:; involved m thi:; case. Under those regulations, in-clinic ingestion 
of methadone must be observ!:'d by staff members, NYCRR § 2021.13 (b), 
and must occur with a frequency of six days a week during the first three 
months, no l!:'s;; than three days a week thereafter through the second year 
of treatmE'nt, and two days a week thereafter. !d.. § 2021.13 (a) ( 1). 
Test:; are requirE'd io prevent hoarding of take-home doses, excessive use 
of methadone, and illicit use of oth!:'r drugs or alcohol, any of which, if 
found, can r!:'~ult in mcrcas!:'d chnic-v1sit frequency or in termmation from 
thr program. !d., §§2021.13 (c)(2), 20'21.13 (g). The programs are also 
required to include "a comprehensive range of rehabilitative services on-site 
under profe;;sional ;;upervision,' ' id, § 2021.13 (3), although participation 
in many of these i:H.'rvices is voluntary and Irregular. 
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heroin addiction have psychological or lifestyle problems 
which reach beyond what can be cured by the physical taking 
of doses of methadone." 399 F. Supp .. at 1039. The crucial 
indicator of successful nwthadone mai11tenance is the patient's 
abstinence from the illegal or excessive use of drugs and 
alcohol. The District Court found that the risk of reversion 
to drug or alcohol abuse declines dramatically after the first 
few months of treatment. Indeed, "the strong majority" of 
patie11ts who have been on methadone maintenance for at 
least a year are free from illicit drug use.0 But a significant 
number are not. On this critical point. the evidence relied 
upon by the District Court reveals that even among partici-
pants with more than 12 months' tenure in methadone main-
tenance programs. the iuciclence of drug and alcohol abuse 
may often approach and evell exceed 25% .10 
This litigation was brought. by the four respondents as a 
class action on behalf of all persons who have been. or \\·ould 
in the future be, subject to discharge or rejection as employees 
of TA by reasou of participation in a methadone maintenance 
program. Two of the responde11ts are former employees of 
TA who were dismissed while they were receiving methadone· 
v ''l concludE' from all the evidetH'f' that the strong majority of meUm-
done maintained pN~on;:; an• sueees>Sful, at lra~t after tlw initial period of 
adju~Stment, in kerping t hem~Plves frer of the usr of hc~roin, other iUicit 
drug~ . and problem drinking." 399 F . Supp., at 1047. 
10 Thu~S, for example : 
"Dr. Trigg of BPth r~rael testified that about 5,000 out of the 6,500--7,000 
patient~ in hi~ clinics have brPn on mPthadone ma.intPnance for a year or 
morP. He further te~tified th<tt 75W of this 5,000 an• free from illi<'it drug 
u~e ." :199 F. Supp., at 1046. 
Similar]~·, althou~h the figure~ tna~· be ~omrwhat higher for the Cit~· and 
Bronx State Hospital progmm~. onl~· 70% of the AHTC patiPtlt~ with a 
yrttr '~ tenure or more wrrr found to ur frep from illicit drug or aleohol 
use. It i~ rea~onable to infPr from thi~ evid('l1e<' that auywherP from 20 
to 20% of thoHe who haV<' bern Oil maintenance for over a year have-
drug or alcohol problem::;. 
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treatment.11 The other two were refused employment by TA, 
one both shortly before and shortly after the successful con-
clusion of his methadone treatment/" a.nd the other while he 
was taking methadone.13 Their complaint alleged that TA's 
blanket exclusion of all former heroin addicts receiving meth-
adone treatment was illegal under the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000 et seq., and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The trial record contains extensive evidence concerning the 
success of methadone maintenance programs, the employ-
ability of persons taking methadone, and the ability of pro-
spective employers to detect drug abuse or other undesirable 
characteristics of methadone users. In general, the District 
Court concluded that there are substantial numbers of meth-
adone users who are just as employable as other members of 
the general population and that normal personnel screening 
procedures-at least if augmented by some method of obtain-
ing information from the staffs of methadone programs--would 
enable TA to identify the unqualified applicants on an indi-
vidual basis. 399 F. Supp., at 1048-1051. On the other 
hand, the District Court recognized that at least one-third of 
the persons receiving methadone treatment-r-and probably a· 
11 Re~pondent Beazer waR dismis8ed in November 1971 when his heroin 
addiction became known to TA and shortly after he enrolled in a metha-
done maintenance program; he r,;ncces8fully terminated his . treatment in 
November 197:3. Respondent Reye" began his methadone treatment in 
1971 and was dismissed by TA in 1972. At the time of trial, in 1975, he 
was still participating in a methadone program. 
12 Hrspondent. Frasier wa8 on methadone maintenance for only "five 
months, from October 1972 until March 1973. TA refu8ed to employ him 
as a bus operator in March 1973 and as a bus cleaner in April 1973. 
ts Respondent Diaz entered a methadone maintenance program in 
December 1968 and was ~till receiving treatment at the time of trial. He 
was refusrd errlJ))oyment ns a maintenance helper in 1970. 
. , 
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good many more-would unquestionably pe classified as· 
unemployable.14 
After extensively reviewing the evidence, the District Court 
briefly stated its conclusion that TA's methadone policy is 
unconstitutional. The conclusion rested on the legal proposi-
tion that a public entity "cannot bar persons from employ-
ment on the basis of criteria which have no rational relation 
to the demands of the job to be performed." 399 F. Supp., 
at 1057. Because it is clear that substantial numbers of 
methadone users are capable of performing many of the jobs 
at T A, the court held that the Constitution will not tolerate a 
blanket exclusion of all users from all jobs. 
The District Court enjoined TA from denying employment 
to any person solely because of participation in a methadone 
maintenance program. Recognizing, however, the special re-
. sponsibility for public safety borne by certain TA employePs 
and the correlatio11 between longevity in a methadone lllain-
tenance program and performance capability. the injunction 
authorized TA to exclude methadone users from specific 
categories of safety-sensitive positions and also to condition 
eligibility on satisfactory performance in a methadone pro-
.gram for at least a year. In other words, the court held that 
TA could lawfully adopt geueral rules excluding all methadone 
14 The District Court summarized the testimony concerning one of the 
largest and most ::mccesl:lful public programs: 
"The witnesr:;es from the Beth Ir:;rael program te:;tified that about one-
third of the patients in that program, after a short period of adjustment, 
nPed very little more than the doses of methadone. The persons in this 
category are situated fairly sati:sfactorily with respect to matter:; such 
a::; family ties, education and jobs. Another one-third of the patients at 
Beth I::;raE:l need a moderate amount of rehabilitation service, including 
vorational assi:stance, for a period of several month:; or about a year. A 
person in this category may, for instancP, have fini:,;hed high school , but 
may have a long heroin history and no employment record. A final one-
third of the patients at Beth hrael need intensive supportive Hervices, are 
performing in the program marginally, and either will be discharged or wi!I 
be on the brink of discharge ." 399 F. Supp., at 1048 . 
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users from some jobs and a large number of methadone users 
from all jobs. 
Almost a year later the District Court filed a supplemental 
opinion allowing respondents to recover attorneys fees under 
42 U. S. C. ~ 2000e-5 (k). This determination was premised 
on the court's additional holding that TA's drug policy vio-
lated Title VII. Having already concluded that the blanket 
exclusion was not rationally related to any business needs of 
TA, the court reasoned that the statute is violated if the 
exclusionary policy has a discriminatory effect against blacks 
nnd Hispanii'P. Thn,t effect was proyen. in t.be District f'ourt's 
view, by two sLa.Listictl: (1) of Lhe employees referreJ Lo TA's 
medical consultant for suspected violation of its drug policy, 
81% are black or Hispa11ic; (2) between 62% and 65% of all 
methadone maintained persons in New York City are black or 
Hispanic. 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-279. The Court. however, 
did not find that TA's policy was motivated by any bias 
against blacks or Hispanics; indeed. it expressly found that 
the policy was not adopted with a discriminatory purpose. 
/d., at 279. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's consti-
tutional holding. While it declined to reach the statutory 
issue, it also affirmed the award of attorneys fees under the 
aegis of the recently enacted Civil Rights Attorneys Fee 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. ~ 1988, which provides ade-
quate support for an award of legal fees to a party prevailing 
on a constitutional claim.1 5 
H• Thr Court of Appeal:,; rever»rd the Di»trict Court on onr i:>l:iue relat-
ing to rehrf. The lower court had denied reinstatement and back-pay 
relief to two of the four named plaintiffs because they adm1ttrd having 
violat(:'d TA's unquestionably valid rule against taking heroin while being 
in TA's employ. Pet. for Ct>rt., at 77a-78a . The Court of Appeals n•-
versed . It determined that the two plamtiffs' former heroin use and viola-
tion of TA '~ rult>:> on that account were 1rrelevant because TA explicitly 
prerrust>d the1r firing exclu::;JvPly on thPir u.sc of methadone. 558 F . 2d 
97, ai lO t 
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After we granted certiorari, Congress amended the Reba-. 
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 700 et seq., to prohibit, 
discrimination against a class of "handicapped individuals" 
that arguably includes certain former drug abusers and certain 
current users of methadone. PulJ. L. 95-251, 95th Cong., 2d 
$ess. Respondents arguf' that the amendment now mandates 
at least the prospective relief granted by the District Court. 
and the Court of Appeals and that we should therefore dis-
miss the writ as improvidently granted. We are satisfied, 
however. that we should decide the constitutional questiou 
presented by the petition. BeforP doing so. we shall discuss 
( 1) the efff'ct of the Rehabilitation Act on this case; and 
(:2) the error in the District Court's analysis of Title VII. 
. I 
Respondf'nts contend that the recent amendment to § 7 (6) 
of the Rehabilitatio11 Act proscribes TA 's enforcement of a 
general rule denying em ploymcn t to methado11e users.'" Even 
w Section 50-1 of thr Hrhahilitation Act, :.!9 U.S. C. § 794, provides: 
· · ~o otlll'rwi~e qualifi<'<i handicapprcl individual in the United State~, a:; 
'Cfpfinrct in ~e('tion 706 (li) of thi~ titlr, shall, solely by re11son of his handi-
rap, he excluded from tlH' participation in, be denied the bPnefit::> of, or 
be ::> uhj Pcled to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial ii::)Hi::>tancc ." 
It i:; :;tipula trd that tlw T A receive:; fpdrrnl financial a":;ii-:1 a nee. 
In relevant part, § 7 (6) of the Act, 29 l' . S. C. § 700 (6), al:l amended, 
provide::; . 
"The term 'handieapped individual' ... mean:; any JH'r:;on who (A) hu::; 
<t phy~iral or mental impnirm!-'nt which ~ub~hmtinlly limits one or more 
of ~urh prr~on 'H major life aetivitie~ , (B) ha~ a record of :;urh an impair-
mrnt, or (C) i,.; regardrd a~ having ~uch an impairment. 
" .. . For purpo~r:; of ~<·ction:; 50:{ nne! 504 ns surh :;ertion~ rela1<' to 
c· mployment , :-;nch term doe~ not include nny individual who i~ an alcoholic 
or drug nbul"er who~e ('llff<'nt ttHe of nlcohol or dmg-:-; pr<'vent~ t<ttrh individ-
ual from performin~~: tlw dtttie" of thr job in que::;tion or who:;e employ-
ment , by rpa:;on of ::;uch current alcohol or drug abuse, would ron~titutP a 
'tlirrct threat to property or thr :;afet ·of otlwr:;." 
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if respoudents correctly interpret the amendment, and even 
if they have a right to enforce that interpretation," the case 
is not moot since their claims arose even before the act itself 
was passed/" aud they have been awarded monetary relief.' 0 
Moreover. the language of the statute, even after its amend-
ment, is not free of ambiguity/0 and no administrative or 
judicial opinions specifically considering the impact of the 
statute on methadone users have been called to our atteution. 
Of greater importance. it is perfectly clear that however we 
might construe the Rehabilitation Act. the concerns that 
prompted our grant of certiorari would still merit our atten-
tion.~' WE' therefore decline to give the sta.tute its first judi-
cial construction at this stage of the litigation. 
17 The qu<•stiou whrth<·r n cau~r of action on behalf of handicapJJ<'d 
person~ may be· implird undt'r § 504 of thr Ht>habilitation Act will be> 
nddn·~,;rd by j hi~ Courj iu 8outhea~tf'rn Cornmuuity College v. Davis, 
No. 78--711, <'e'rt. grantrd .la11. K, 1979. 
J.o The lntesj ad of ai!Pged di~crimination cited in re:;pondrnt~' l'omplaint 
oermTed in April 197:~, whilr tht' Art wa~ pass<>d on 8Pptembrr 26, 197:~, 
Pub. L. 9:~-112, Titlr V, and the am<-'ndment to§ 7 (6) went into effpcj in 
Novt'mb<'r (\ , 1978. 
1u 8<'<' n. 17, supra. 
20 In ordrr for HlP Di"trict Court'~ finding:; to bring the rPHpondPnt clas~ 
eonclusivrl~ - within jh<' Act, wr would havP to find that denying emplo~·­
meul to a mPthadonP u::;er lH'rausP of thaj u~P amounts to excluding an 
"otll(>rwise qualified handicappPd individual .. . ;-;olrly by rPa~on of his 
handi<·ap." Among othpr i~~tws, thi,- would require u~ to detpnnin<' 
(1) whPOwr 11f'roin addicts or C\IIT('llt rnPthadonP n~Pr" qualif~· a::; ' 'hancli-
c·app\'< me Ividuall sl i. t' .. whP1hcr th::d addiction or Uti<' i"' (or is 
pPrrrived a::;) a " physical impairment which ;;ub;;tantiall~- limit~ one or 
more ... major life funrtiou::;"; (2) wlwthPr nwthadone use prevents the 
individual '·from JWrforming HlP dntie:; of the job" or "would constitute a 
direcj jhretd to Jll'OJWrty or tlw Hafet~· of others" ; and (3) whetht>r the-
mc·tnber::; of the l'P~pondPnt ria"~ arP "otherwi~r qualified"-th<> meaning of 
which phrase i"' nt i~~U<' in Southeastern Community Collegl' v. Davis, 
Xo. 78-711, cP!'t . granted .Jan .. 1979. 
21 Sre ante, at 11. 1 and :trrompauyiug jext. HP~pondent,; ma~' Pxag-
gemte th<> degrP<' to whirh I hr recent nmeudmrnt nlterrd thr law a"' it 
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II 
Although respondents have consistently relied on both stat-
utory and constitutional claims. the lower courts focused 
primarily ·on the latter. Thus. when the District Court 
decided the Title VII issue, it did so only as an afterthought 
in order to support an award Qf attorneys fees; the Court of 
Appeals did not even reach the Title VII issue. We do not 
condone this departure from settled federal practice. "If 
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in 
the process of constitutional adjudica.tion, it is that we ought 
not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such 
adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Co. v. Mc-
Laughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105. Before deciding the constitu-
tional question, it was incumbent on those courts to consider 
whether the statutory grounds might be dispositive.22 What-
existed when we granted C('rtiorari. Ev('n before the Court of Appeal~ 
heard argument in this ca~e, in fact, the Attorney Gem~ral of the United 
States had isHued an interpretation of the Act as it then existed which 
concluded that the Act ''does iu general prohibit discrimination against 
alcoholic;; and drug addicts in federally-aH:oisted program~ .... " Opinion 
of the Honorable Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States 
to Honorable Joseph A. Califano, Seeretary, Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, April 12, 1977. Re~:>pondents brought this interpreta-
tion to our attention before we granted certiorari. Brief in Opposition to 
Certiorari, at A5-A6. 
22 "From Haybum's Case, 2 Dall. 409, to Alma Mota!' Co. v. Timken-
Detroit Axle Co. and the Hatch Act case decided this term, this Court has 
followed a policy of ::;trict nece:osity in disposing of constitutional issue::;. 
The earli(':ot exemplifications, too well known for repeating the history here, 
aro::;e in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions and in applications 
of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controver:oy 
limitation. U.S. Const., Art. III. ..• 
"The policy, however, ha~ not been limited to jmi~dictional determina-
tions. For, in addition, 'i he Court rhasl developed, for its own govern-
ance in thf CHHt'~ confessedly within itR jurisdiction, a series of rules under 
which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all tlw constitutional 
questions pres::>ed upon It for decision .' Thus, as those rules were listed 
·in :;upport of the st<~tement quoted, con,;titutional is;;ues affecting legisla-
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ever their reasons for not doing so,23 we shall first dispose of 
the Title VII issue.24 
The District Court's findings do not support its conclusion 
tion will not be determined in friendly, nonadven;~u~· proreedingR: in 
advance of the necrs::lity of drciding them; in broader terms than are 
required by the precise fHrt~ to which the ruling is to be applied; if the 
record pre~ent~ some other ground upon which thr case rna~· be dispo~rd 
of; at the instance of on<> who fail~ to show that he iR injured by the 
statute's operation, or who baH availed himself of it;,; benefits; or if a con-
struction of the ~tatute i~ fair!~· po~sible by which the que:stion may be 
avoided." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-569 (foot-
notes omitted), quoting Ash u•ander· v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (Brandeis, 
J ., concmring) . 
23 Respondent~ suggrst thai th<> lower courts propPrly reached the ron-
stitutional Issue first becan~<' onl~· under the Equal Protection Clause could 
all of the cla:;s members, including white methadon<> user;,; (who prr-
sumably do not have ::;tanding in this cas<> undrr Title VII or § 1981) 
obtain all of the relief including backpay, sought in their complaint. In 
addition, they point to TA'"' argument that Tit!P VII nnd § 1981 are 
unconstituhonal insofar as they authorize relief against a statr subdivision 
without any direct allegation or proof of intrntional discrimination. cr. 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445; National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833; Washington\'. Davis, 426 U.S. 229; Fry v. United States. 
421 U. S. 542; Katzenbadt v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641. Under this latter 
point, it is argued that til<' District Court quite properly drcided to addre~s 
1 he con:-;titutionality of n municipal agrncy's hiring practices brfore 
addre~;smg the constitutional it~ · of two Ach; of Congr<'S:>. 
Whatrvpr thr theoretiral validity of respondents' explanationR for the 
action~ of the Diotrict Comf nnd th<> Comt of Appeal~, the fact r<'mains 
.that W<' arP forced to speculnte about what motivated thPm because they 
never explained their haste to address a naked constitutional issue despite 
the presence in the rase of alternative statutory theories. It also bears 
noting that in its second opinion the District Court did decide that TA's 
policy violated a federal statute, ami its decision, without addrro:sing any 
con~titutional i~sue, provided a :-;tatutory basi:; for virtually all of the relief 
that it ultnnately awarded. Had it ronfront<'d the iosue, therefore, it, 
presumably would have concluded that it could have drcided the case 
without addre:-;,.;ing the ronHtitutional iH~ur on which it initially decided the 
case. 
21 Although thr t>xnct applirnbilit~· of§ 1981 in ra~rH Hurh a" this has not 
hPell deridPd h~' thi~ Comt, and was not rearhed h ' either of the rourt~ 
I I 
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-that TA's regulation prohibiting the use of narcotics, or its: 
interpretation of that regulation to encompass users of meth-
1\.done, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
A prima facie violation of the Act may be established by 
statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has 
the effect of denying the members of one race equal access to 
employment opportunities.2 ~ Because the two statistics on 
which respondents and the District Court relied are incapable 
of proving that T A's rule had a disparate effect on blacks and 
Hispanics, the Title VII threshold has not been crossed in 
this case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S .. 
792, 802.26 
First, the District Court noted that 81 %· of the employees 
referred to T A's medical director for suspected violation of its. 
narcotics rule were either black or Hispanic. But respondents 
have only challellged the rule to the extent that it is construed 
to apply to methadone users, and tha.t statistic tells us 
nothing about the racial composition of the employees sus-
pected of using methadone.27 Nor does the record give us 
below, it serm~ clrar that it affords no grrat('r ~~~b~tantive protection 
than Title VII. Accordingly, our trratmrnt of the Titlr VII claim al:;o 
di~pose:; of thr § 1981 claim without nrf•ri of a rrmand. 
2 " "Statisticl'i arr ... romprtent in proving rmployment discrimination. 
W f:' caution only that stati~tic:-; arf:' not irrf:'futable; thr~· comr in infinite 
variety and, likr any othrr kind of rvidencP, thry may br rrbutted. In 
short, thrir usefulnf:'~s drpf:'nd~ on all thr :<urrounding facts and circum-
stance~ . '' Teamsters \'. United States, 413 U. S. 324, 3:39-340 (footnote· 
omitted) . ( 
2 " Breau:;<' of this holding, we need not addres~ thr constitutiona l chal- . • • 
lenge madf:' by TA to Titlf:' VII insofar as it authorizf:'" rf:'lief again::;t a \~ 
municipal agenry undrr thr circumstances of thi:s case . Ser n. 2:3, supr-a. ~~\ 
21 Indeed, it i~ probable that none of the rmployers rompri~ing thi~ 
81 % were mrthadone usrr" . The part irs :;tipulated that : 
"TA rmploypf:',.; :;bowing physi<'al manife:;tatiom; of drug abusr other than t 
the definite pre:;rnce of morphine or methadone or othrr illicit drug in the-
urine arr rPfrrred to [the mrdical dirrctor_l for consultation .. .. " App.,. 
at 86A (rmphal'iis addrd) . 
In view of thi:; :stipulation and thr Di:strict Court '::; finding th11t few if any-
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any information about the number of black, Hispanic, or 
white persons who were dismissed for using methadone. 
Second, the District Court noted that about 63% of the 
persons in New York receiving methadone maintenance are 
blacl< or Hispanic. We do not know. however, how many of 
these persons ever worked or sought to work for T A. This 
statistic therefore reveals little if anything about the racial 
composition of the class of TA job applicants and employees 
receiving methadone treatment. More particularly, it tells us 
11othing about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and 
employees who have participated in methadone maintenance 
programs for over a year-the only class improperly excluded 
by T A's policy under the District Court's analysis. The 
record demonstrates, in fact. that the figure is virtually irrele-
vant because a substantial portion of the persons included in 
it are either unqualified for other reasons-such as the illicit 
use of drugs and alcohol ~'-or have received successful assist-
ance in finding jobs with employers other than TA. The 
evidence simply does 11ot establish that TA's policy has had 
a greater effect on the members of one race than another.'w 
physical manife~tatiou>< of drug abuse characterize methadone maintained 
per!"OP~. :~99 F. Supp., at 1042- 1045, it seems likely that ~uch per~on~ 
would not be included in the i'itati~tical pool referred to by the District 
Court. 
28 To demon:st rate employability, the District Court referrrd to a study 
indicating that 34 to 59% of the methadone u~ers who have been in a 
maintenance program for a ;mbstantial period of time are unemployed. 
The evidencr wa~ inconclusive with respect to all methadone u~er~. :399 
.F. Supp., at 1047. However, the director of the :second largest program 
in New York City test ified that only 33% of the entire methadone patient 
populatiOn in that program were employabl<>. Trial Transcript, Janu-
ary 10, 1975 , at :H5. On the :,;tati:,;tic~ relating to illicit u~e of drugs and 
nlcohol, :;eP ante, at 7. 
20 "[EJvideuce :,;bowing that the figure:; for the general population might 
not accurate!~· reflect the pool of qualified job applicants" will render these 
figureR uselr:s:; m makmg out a prima facie case." 1'eamste1·s v. United 
States. supra, .t:n (T , S., at :340 11 . 20. Thit>, of CO\II':>e, is not to ~ay ''that r 
a ~tat1~tiral ~bowing of di~proportionat<> impact mu~t alwayi'i bP ba~ed on 
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We conclude that respondents failed to prove a prima facie 
violation of Title VII. We therefore must reach the consti-
tutional issue. 
III 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within 
it's jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Clause 
announces a fundamental principle: the State must govern 
impartially. General rules that apply evenhandedly to all 
persons within the jurisdiction unquestionably comply "·ith 
this principle. Only whrn a govrrnmental unit adopts a rule 
that has a special impact on less than all the persons subject 
to its jurisdiction does the question whether this principle is 
violatrd arise. 
In this case, TA 's Rule 11 (b) places a meaningful rest ric.,. 
tion on all of its employees and job applicants; in that sense 
the rule is one of general applicability ami satisfies the equal 
protection principlr without further inquiry. The District 
Court, however, interpreted the rule as applicable to the 
limited class of persons who regularly use narcotic drugs, 
including nwthadone. As so interpreted, we arc necessarily 
confronted with the question 'vvhether the rule reflects an 
impermissiblP bias against a special class. 
RespondPnts have neVf'r questioned the validity of a special 
rule for all users of narcotics. Rather, they originally con-
au annJ .,·~i~ of thr rharart<•ri~tie~ of aetu::~l applicants." Dothard v. 
Rawlinsou . .t:3:l U. 8. a21, 3:30. Dot hard rpjeeted an~· ~uch rrquirrment 
hrrau::w t!H' rxi,.;t('l1P<' of thr allrg<•dl~· di~criminator~· hiring prartice ma.v 
it,.;rlf ,.;k<'W thr pool of actual applicant,.; h~· di~couraging many otllf'rwi~r 
qualified JWrson~ from appl~· ing . What wr an' ::;n~·iug i~ tlwt in this ca~<' 
tlH're "is rPa~on to supposr" that thr chara!'teri,ties of the two Ht::~ti,.;tiral 
group~ n·lied on h~· rr,.;pond!'nl,.; do "diffrr mnrkedl)·" from t]l(' rharactrri:;-
t ir~ of thr labor pool from wh1rh TA derivr,.; its rmplo~·rr,;. Ibid. Ac-
cording!~· , ''thr <·videJJCl' aetna II~· pn',.;<'JJtPd I doP" not I on it~ facr ronHpicn-
onsly d!'mon,.;trat<· I thr I job rPqnir<'lllPIIi ·~ grosH]~· di,.;criminatory impart .'' 
Id , at a:H. 
,, 
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tended that persons receiving methadone should not 
included within a class that is otherwise unobjectionable. 
Their constitutional claim was that methadone users are 
entitled to be treated like most other employees and appli-
cants rather than like other users of narcotics. But the 
District C'JOurt's findings unequivocally establish that there 
are relevant differences between persons using methadone 
regularly and persons who use no narcotics of any kind. ao 
Respond~nts no longer question the need, or at least the 
justification, for special rules for methadone users. Indeed, 
they vigorously defend the District Court's opinion which 
.expressly held that it would be permissible for TA to have a 
special rule denying methadone users any employment unless 
they had been undergoing treatment for at least a year, and 
an.other special rule denying even the most senior and reliable 
8<1 The Di~trict Court found that methadone is a narcotic. See 399 F. 
Supp., at 1038. See al:>o id .. at 1044 · ("The evidence is that, during the 
time patiPnt:> are being brought up to their constant dosage of methadone 
(a period of about six weeki), there may be complaints of drowsiness, 
insomma , PXCPss sweating, constipation, and perhaps some other symp-
toms.") . l\JorPovl'r, l'Very membl'r of the class of methadone users was 
formerly addicted to the use of hProm. None is completely cured ; other-
wise, thl're would be no contmuing need for treatment. All require some 
measurP of ,:pecial superYi:;wn, and all must structure their weekly 
routinP~ around mandator~· appearances at methadone clinics. The clinics 
make periodic checks as long as the treatment continues in order to detect 
evidl'nce of drug abuse. Employers must review, and sometimes verify, 
these checks; since the record indicates that the information supplied by 
treatment. centers i" not uniformally reliable, see n. 7, supra, the employer 
has a special and continuing re:<pon:>ibilit~· to review the condition of these 
person:>. 
In addition , a ,;ubstantiul pereE-nta~te of per,;ons taking mrthadone will 
Hot suc<·essfully eompletP the trratment program. The findings do not 
ind1cate with any preci~Jon the numher who drop out, or the number who 
can fairly be claf!sifiPd a~ unemployable, but the evidencP indicates that it 
may well be a majonty of tbo~P taking mPthadone at an~· given time. Sre· 
nn . 13 And 26, supra. 
covered by 
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methadone users any of the m.ore dangerous jobs in the 
system. 
The constitutional defect in TA's employment policies, 
according to the District Court, is not that TA has special 
rules for methadone users, but rather that some members of 
tho class should havr been exempted from some requirements 
of the special rules. Left intact by its holding are rules 
requiring special supervision of methadone users to detect 
evidence of drug abuse, and excluding them from high-risk 
employment. Accepting those rules, the District Court none-
theless concluded that employment in nonsensitive jobs could 
not be denied to methadone users who had progressed satis-
factorily with their treatment for one year, and who, when 
examined individually, satisfied TA's employment criteria. 
In short, having r·ecognized that disparate treatment of meth-
adone users simply because they are methadone users is 
permissible- and having excused TA from an across-the-board 
requirement of individual consideration of such persons-the 
District Court COllstrued the Equal Protection Clause as 
requiring T A to adopt additional and more precise special 
rules for that special class. 
But any special rule short of total exclusion that TA might 
adopt is likely to be less precise than the one that it currently 
enforces. If eligibility is marked at any intermediate point-
whether after one year of treatment or later-the classifica-
tion will inevitably discriminate between employees or appli-
cants equally or almost equally apt to achieve full recovery.n 
Even the District Court's opinion did not rigidly specify one 
year as a constitutionally mandated measure of the period of 
treatment that guarantees full recovery from drug addictior1.~2 
.st It may W(•ll be, in fact, that many methadone users who lmve bef•n in 
prugramH for ~omething le~s than a. year arr nctually more qualifiPd for 
employment than many otlwr~ who have been in a program for longer 
than a. ~vca r. 
~2 "The TA i~ not prevented from making reasonable rul~ and rPgula-
tion:; about mPthadonP maintahwd per~on~-~ueh aR requiring ~nti:;factory 
.. 
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rrhe uncertainties associated with the rehabilitation of heroin 
addicts precluded it from identifying any bright line marking 
the point at which the risk of regression ends.'j3 By contrast, 
the "no drugs" policy now enforced by TA is supported by 
the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program 
(or other drug use) continues. a degree of uncertainty per-
sists.34 Accordingly, an employment policy that postpones 
eligibility until the treatment program has been completed, 
rather than accepting an iutermediate point on an uncertain 
line, is rational. It is IH~ither unprincipled nor invidious in 
the sense that it implies disrespect for the excluded subclass. 
At its simplest. the Distt'ict Court's conclusion was that 
TA's rule is broader than necessary to exclude those meth-
adone users who are not actually qualified to work for TA. 
We may assume not only that this conclusion is correct but also f 
pf'rformauce in a program for n. period of time such as a year . ... " 
::399 F . Supp., at 1058. 
3a ThesE\ uucertaiutie~ arc evic!Pnt not only in the Di~trict Court '~ find-
ings but abo in lt>gislative con~ideration of the problem. Sec M m·shall v. 
United States, 414 U. S. 417, ,125-427. 
34· The completiOn of thf' program also marks the point at which the 
employee or applicant con::;idt>r::> himi:ielf cured of drug dependence. More-
over, it it~ the point a.t which the employee/applicant no longer must makr 
regular viHitR to a met.hadoiw clinie, no longt>r has access to free metha-
done that might be hoarded and taken in exces:;ive and phyl:lically cliH-
ruptive do::;PH, and at which a simple urine tel:lt-as opposed to a urine test 
followed up by rft'orts to verify the bona fide::; of the subject'~ participa-
tion in a. methadone program, and of the program itself-suffices to prove 
compliance with TA'~ rules. 
Retipondents argue that the validity of these con~idera.tions is belied by 
TA's trentmt>nt of alcoholicl:l. Although TA rt>fuses to hire new employee~ 
with drinking problems, it continues in its t>mploy a large numbf'r of 
per~on~ who have either been found drinking on the job or have been 
depmecl unfit for dut~r becauHe of prior drinking. Thesf' situations give 
risP to discipline but are handled on an individual basis. But the fact 
that TA has thr l'f'~ourcrH to expend on onr elass of problem employt>es· 
dors not by it~elf e:stablish a con~titutional duty on its part to come HI~ 
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that it is probably unwise for a large employer like TA to rely· 
on a general rule instead of individualized consideration of 
every job applicant. But these assumptions concern matters 
of personnel policy that do not implicate the principle safe-
guarded by the Equal Protection Clause.a" As the District 
Court recognized, the special classification created by TA 's 
rule serves the general objectives of safety and efficiency. 'll' 
Moreover, the exclusionary line challenged by respondents "is 
not one which is directed 'against' any individual or category 
of persons, but rather it represents a policy choice ... made 
by that branch of Government vested with the power to make· 
such choices.'' Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 428. 
Because it does not circumscribe a class of persons character-
ized by some unpopular trait or affiliation, it does not create 
or reflect any special likelihood of bias on the part of the· 
ruling majority.a7 Under these circumstances, it is of no · 
" 5 Tlw Di~trict Court al:-<o concludPd that TA's ru]p violatE'~ the Due· 
Procf':;s Claus(• bccau~e it ('rf'atP:; !lll ''irrf'butabiP prP:;umption" of unem-
ployability on the part of mrthadonf' u:;Prs. 399 F . Supp., at 1057. Rc-
- _/ \ ____ :~pondPntt do . not rely ou the due procf'ss argument in thi:; Court, and· 
~/ we find no merit 111 lt. 
ao "I L jPgislativP cla~;-;ifications arf' valid unle"'" they bear 110 rational 
relation"hip to tlw State's objectJve". Massachusetts Bd. of Retiremeut v. 
Murgia. f427 U.S. 307,3141. State lf.>gi"lation ·dof.>s not violatf.> thr &tual 
Protrction Clau:;e merely brcau::;f' the cla:;sifications I it makes] are imper-
fect.' Dandridge v. lflilliams, :397 lT. S. 471, 485.'' Washington v. 
}"akirna Indian Nation. - 11. S. - , - (slip op., at 38). Se!' also· 
Vance v. Bradley, - U. S. -, -, quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v .. 
Dumas &·hoot District, ;3(il tl. S. :376, :3H5. (''Even if the cla:;:;ification 
involved hf'l'P lH to ;;onw f'Xtf'nt both under- and over·inclusive, and heucc-
t lw !me drawn by Congre:-;:; imperfpct, it i:; tlf'Vf'rt hrle:;::; t hf' rule that in a . 
l 
<'H~(' likP thiH 'pprfcction i::; b~- no mean" requirrd. 'r..-----------....1 
81 Smcr Barbier v. Cou nolly . 11:~ U. S. 27, the Court';; equal protPction 
cai'IPH havr n •cogmzed a distinction lwtwrf'n ·' mvidiou:; discrimination ,'" 
/If .. at :u-1. e .. rla:;sificatJoui-i drawn "with au evil PYP and an uuf'qual 
hand" or motivatf'd by "a frrling of antipath~·" against, a ::;perific group 
of n·:sid<>nt~. Vitk Wo \'. llo]Jkins. llS F. S. :356, :373-374; Soon Hing v. 
' Croll'l<'!!. 11:~ F . R. 7o:3, 710; i><'P also Quang IViny v. Kir-kendall, 223 U. S_ 
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constitutional significance that the degree of rationality is not 
as great with respect to certain ill-defined subparts of the 
classification as it is with respect to the classification as a 
whole. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84.aH 
No matter how unwise it may be for TA to refuse employ-
ment to individual car cleaners, track repairmen, or bus 
drivers simply because they are receiving methadone treat-
ment, the Constitution does not authorize a Federal Court to 
interfere in that policy decision. The judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
59-and thos(' ~pecial rul('~ that "a r(' often uec~~ary for general b('n('fitH 
[::;uch as] supplying watrr, preventing fire~, lighting streets, opening parks, 
and many other object::;." Barbier, supr·a, 113 U. S., at :n. See abo 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239-241. Quite plainly, TA 's Rule 
11 (b) wa~ motivated by TA'::; intere:>t in operating a safe and efficient 
transportation sy~tem rather than by any ~pecial animus against a opecifir 
group of persons. Cf. 414 F. Supp., at 279. Respond('nts recognize thi~ 
valid gPneral motivation, a:> did the District Court, and for that rea::;on 
ne1th('r challen e TA ';; rule a~ it applies to all narcotic user~, or Pven to 
all methadonE' user::;. B('cau::;p re::;pondents merely challengE' thP rule in::;o-
far a::; it applies to some methadone user~, that challenge does not even 
rai~e the que::;tion whether thr rulP falls on th<> "invidiou~" Hide of the 
Barbier distinction. Accordingly, there is nothing to give ri;;e to a pre-
~umption of illegality and to warrant our e::;pecially "attentive judgment." 
Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. :n2, :327. 
118 " When a legal distinction is determined, as no on<> doubts then• may 
be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other ex-
tremes, a pomt has to be fixed or a line ha::; to b(' drawn, or gradually 
p1cked out by succ('::;;;ive drci::;ions, to mark whrre the cha11ge takes place . 
Looked at by it~elf without regard to the nrceo~ity behind it the line or 
pomt ~ee m::; arbitrary. It might a::; well or nearly a~ well be a little more 
to one tiide or thP other. But when it 1~ ::;een that a line or point there 
mu~t be, and that there 1~ uo mathematical or logical way of fixing it pre-
ri~ely, the decisiOn of the lrgi::;laturP mu~t be acceptrd unlrs~ wr can say 
that it i:s very wid(' of any reasonable mark. " Louisville Gas Cv. v. Cole-. 
man, 277 U . S. :32,41 (Holmr;;, J., di:s~enting). 
~u:punu <!Jcttrl ttf tlrt 'Jlhrift~ ~hdtg 
'J)ag!p:ngfutt. ~. <!J. 2llgiJ.1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 30, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1427 -New York City Transit Authority v. 
Beazer 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ~~· 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
.:§u:prtm.t <!Jourl of tlrt 'Jllni.ttb ;§taft& 
1Jraefrington. ~. <!}. 2.0p't~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
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January 30, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1427 - New York City Transit 
Authority v. Beazer 
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cc : The C onference 
/ 
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January 30, 1979 
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Dear John, 
In due course, I shall circulate a 
dissent in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 




TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
MEMORANDUM 
RE: New · York -Transit · Authoritv v. Beazer, No. 77-1427 
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist have joined 
Justice Stevens' opinion, and I am sure you and the Chief are 
with Justice Stevens in the result. At this point, a Court to 
reverse the Second Circuit seems certain. The question is 
whether you should write separately and reach the issue I feel 
the case presents: whether the TA also may refuse to employ 
former narcotics users, including former methadone users. 
Assuming that Justice Stevens would not be willing to 
rewrite the opinion, I would recommend that you consider writinq 
2. 
separately. Assuminq I am correct that the former user issue is 
presented by this case, I think it is a bit unprofessional to 
represent to the contrary. More importantly, the opinion as it 
currently reads leaves the clear impression that a ban on former 
users would be unconstitutional. This is a result the Conference 
did not vote for and, I believe, is a matter that should not be 
left to implication. If the TA may not refuse to hire former 
users consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, it should be 
told so directly; and if such a ban is constitutional, albeit 
unwise, the TA should not be left with the opposite impression. 
For the reasons we have discussed previously, I think a 
ban on former users, at least to the extent it is somewhat 
limited in time and is not a lifetime exclusion, does satisfy the 
rational basis test. I would be happy to draft a brief 
concurring opinion indicating how the issue is presented in this 
case and resolving it in favor of the TA. The opinion could be 
written as concurring in Justice Stevens' opinion while 
supplementing it. Such an opinion would have the benefit of 
assuring the TA that it could continue its current policy without 
any constitutional objections, whatever the wisdom of its 
actions. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr · Justj_ce Brennan 
Mr. Just:Lce Stewart 
Mr · Justi. ce Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blac:kmun 
vi1r. Ju8t5.ee Po well 
Mr. Just ice R~hnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice White 
Circulated: 
1st DRAFT Recirculated: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77- 1427 
New York City Transit Authority l On Writ of Certiorari to 
et al., Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Sec-
Carl A. Beazer et al. ond Circuit. 
[February --, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
Although the Court purports to apply settled principles 
to unique facts, the result reached does not square with either 
Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, but 
respectfully, I dissent. 
I 
As an initial matter, the Court is unwise in failing to 
remand the statutory claims to the Court of Appeals. The 
District Court decided the Title VII issue only because it 
provided a basis for allowing attorney's fees. 414 F. Supp. 
277, 278 (SDNY 1976) . The Court of Appeals did not deal 
with Title VII, relying instead on the intervening passage of 
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976/ which 
authorized the a ward of fees for success on the equal protec-
tion claim today held infirm by the Court. 558 F. 2d 97, 
99-100 (CA2 1977). In such circumstances, and finding that 
we disagree with the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the 
constitutional question, we would usually remand the unex-
plored alternative basis for relief. E. g., Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. l\'RDC, 435 U. S. 519, 549 (1978). 
That course would obviate the need for us to deal with what 
the Co urt considers to be a factual issue or at least would pro-
vide assistance iu analyzing the issue. 
1 42 !1 , 8. ( ' §WRI-., 
.. 
1 FEB 197S 
------
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Because the Court has decided the question. however, I 
must express my reservations about the merits of that decision. 
In a disparate impact hiring case such as this. the plaintiff 
must show that the challenged practice excludes members of 
a protected group in numbers disproportionate to their inci-
dence in the pool of potential employees.2 Respondents made 
out a sufficient. though not strong, prima. facie case by proving 
that about 63% of those using methadone in the New York 
City area are black or Hispanic ~ and that only about 20% 
of the population as a whole belongs to one of those groups. 
I think it fair to conclude. as the District must have, that 
blacks and Hispanics suffer three times as much from the 
operation of the challenged rule excluding methadone users 
as one would expect from a neutral practice. Thus, excluding 
those who are or have been in methadone programs "oper-
.ate[s] to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate num-
ber" of blacks and Hispanics-. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424,429 (1971). 
In response to this, the Court says only that the 63% 
statistic was not limited to those who worked for or sought 
to work for petitioners and to those· who have been successfully 
maintained on methadone. Ante, at 15-16. I suggest, in the 
first place, that these attacks on facially valid statistics should 
2 See ante, at 14 ; Dothard v. Ra'Wlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 329 (1977). 
The failure to hire is not "because of" race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin if the advrrse relationship of the ch·anenged practice to one of those 
factors is purely a mattrr of chance-a statistical coincidence. See Griggs, 
supra, at 430 ; Civil Rights Art of 19M, § 703 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e--2 
(a) . Bryond the statistically Hignificant relationship between rncr and 
participation in methadone programs shown by the figures lwre, r<"spond-
ents introduced direct evidence thal the high frequency of minorities 
nmong the di~qualifiecl group was not ju~t a chance aberration. See n. 11, 
infra. 
3 The rvidencP beforr 1he Di~trir1 Conrt established that 80% of heroin 
addict~ in the New York City metropoli1an area, the source of clien1s for 
tl;l~~':lc m~·l hadorH' rlinirs. are black or lli~lmnic. 
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have been made in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 331 (1977); 
the first contention was not even made in this Court. It also 
seems to me that petitioners have little to complain about 
insofar as thP makeup of the applicant pool is concerned siHce 
they refused ou grounds of irrelevancy to allow discovery of 
the racial background of the applicants denied employment 
pursuant to the methadone rule. 
In any event, I cannot agree with the Court's assertions 
that this evidence "reveals little if anything," "tells us 
nothing." ami is "virtually irrelevant." Ante, at 14-15. 
There is not a shadow of doubt that methadone users do apply 
for employment with petitioner. and because 63% of all meth-
adone users are black or Hispanc, there is every reason to con-
clude that a majority of methadone users who apply are also 
from these minority groups. Almost 5% of all applicants are 
rejected due to the rule, and undoubtedly many black and 
Hispanic are among those rejected. Why would proportion-
ally fewer of them than whites secure work with petitioner 
absent the challenged practice? The Court gives no reason 
whatsoever for re:iecting this se11sible inference. and where 
the inference depends so much on local knowledge. I would 
accept the judgment of the District Court rather than purport 
to make an independent juclgrnent from the banks of the 
Potomac. At the very least. as I have said, 1 would seek the 
views of the Court of Appeals. 
The Court complains that even if minority groups make 
up 63 ?{ of methadone-user applicants, this statistic is an 
insufficient indicator of the compositon of the group found 
by the District Court to have been wrongly excluded-that 
is, those who have been successfully maintained for a year or 
more. I cannot. however. presume with the Court that blacks 
or Hispamcs wlll be less likely than whites to succeed on 
methadone. I would have thought. uutil rebutted. the pre-
sumption would bP onP of an equal chance of success, and 
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there has been no rebuttaL '''ith all due respect, I would 
accept the statistics as making a prima facie case of disparate 
impact. Obviously, the case could have been stronger, but 
this Court is unjustified in displacing the District Court's 
acceptance of uncontradicted, relevant evidence. 
II 
I also disagree with the Court's disposition of the Equal 
Protection claim in light of the facts established below. The 
District Court found that the evidence conclusively established 
that petitioners exclude from employment all persons who are 
successfully on methadone mai11tenance-that is, those who 
after one year are "free of the use of heroin, other illicit 
drugs, and problem drinking." 399 F. Supp., at 1047-and 
those who have graduated from methadone programs and 
remain drug-free for less than five years; 1 that past or present 
4 Because tllP ruiP is nuwritten iu rPlrvant part. thPre is confusion about 
it~ ~cope. Thr Court a~~rrt,; that it does not exclude those who formerly 
u"ed methadone, nnd that the Di~trict Court "did not settle the question of 
what pohcy TA rnforce" in thi:; n·spect . ... " Ante, at 3 n. 3. In fact, 
however, petitioner:; open!~· admit that they automatically exclude former 
methndone u~Prs unit"Hii the~· "haw been eompletely drug frpe and have had 
a staulr history for at least five years." Brief for J>etitioner:; 5. And I 
quote the District Court's act11al finding which in context is unlike that 
described by the majority : 
"It is clear that a relatiwl~r recent methadone user would be subject to the 
blanket exclusionary polic~-. However, t11e TA ha~ indicated that there 
might be some fiexibility with respect to a per~on who had once u~ed 
m<·thadom', but had been free of such use for a period of five year~ or 
more " 399 F. Supp. 1082, 103(i (SDNY 1975) . 
The Court find~ no '' conerete dispute between adverse litigants" over 
thP former n:,;er~ policy berausf' no former nser b entitled to relief under 
tlw Di~tnct Court ':,; injunction . Ante, at 3 n. 3. But rP,;po11deu1 Frazier 
i:< a fornwr u"er, seP ic!., ai 7 n . t! , and the Di::;tric1 Court cxpre::;slr grantPd 
hitn rehd, including lntckpa~- from the tune he was rrjecter! a~ a recent 
former mE'thadmw wwr. App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a-78a . The Court 
,tpparmtly read~ I be Di~1 rict Court 's mjunctwn aA protecting on]~- those 
ver. on~ who had hc·cn in methadone pmgram:; for n year or Junger befon: 
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successful mf'thadone mainteuan'ce is not a meaningful pre-
dictor of poor performance or conduct in most job categories; 
that petitioners could use their normal employee-screening 
mechanisms to separate the successfully maintained users 
from the unsuccessful; and that pf'titioners do exactly that for 
other groups that common sense indicates might also be sus-
pect employees.~ Petitioners did not challe11ge these factual 
conclusions in the Court of Appeals, but that court nonethe-
less rev~wed the evidence and found that it overwhelmingly 
support~he District Court's fiudings. 557 F. 2d, at 99. It 
bears repeating, then, that both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals found that those who have been maintained 
on methadone for a least a year and who are free from the use 
of illicit drugs and alcohol can easily be identified through 
normal personal procedures and, for a great many jobs, are as 
they WPl'<' run·d. It i~ inered1biP that tlw Di:strict Court would have 
pum~lwd tho~P p<•r::;on~ able to triumph ovrr hProin addictiOn iu lr,.;,.; than 
u year. And the context of tlw Di:strict Court'~ ordrr, rombinrcl with the 
grant of rrh<'f to re~ponclrnt Fra::;irr, mak~ it rlrar that the court intendPd 
lo prot<'ct, and had good rra~on to do :;o, all fornwr methadone u:srr,.; ns 
well a~ tho~e eurn•nt w<<'r;,; who have b('(•n ~ucce~:;fully maintamed for more 
than a yPai . ( Whrre 111 tlu,.; di~sPnt l rdrr to "~uree:-<sful methadone 
lJ<>rr~ · 1 m<•an all tho~P in tlw da,:; pi·ote<·ted by the Di~trict Court, in-
dudmg fornwr u:;er" ) 
r, l{p,.;pondl'nl~ pre~ented nunwrous top rxp<•rt~ in thi~ field and large 
('!lliJioyrr~ Pxperienced w1t h former lwrom usrrs t reatPd with met hadonr. 
Hoth ~1d!'~ rp~t ed aftrr SIX da~·,.; of trw!, but the Di::>t net Court demanded 
ninP mor<' da~·~ of furthPr factual dev<'lopmrnt, and an eight-hour in~pec­
tiOn of pPiitioner~ ' facilitieR, lJrCall~<' it did uol h<•licvP that the rvidcncr 
eould br ::;o one-sidrdly m respondents ' favor. The court corrrctly rralized 
it~ re::<pon::<Jblhty iu a puhlie law caRP of this trpe to demand thr wholr 
stor~ · lwforP makmg a con,.;htuhonal rulmg. Srr Chaye~, Thr Hole of tlw 
Jud!-(r in Puhhe Law LitigatiOn, H!) Harv. L. Hrv. 1281 (1976). Tlw 
DJ:;tnC't Court ealle(l ~1x w1tm·:;~r,.; of Jt,.; own, and 1t cho:;r tlwm primarily 
IJt'cau:;P thr~· had wrntrn art!Cl!'" on methadon<' mmntenaner that p<'fition-
('1'" as~rrtl'd had :;how11 tlw tmrehabihty of that mPthod of cl!'almg w1th 
herom addl('t!On It abo corrrctly expr<'~:-;('(l it" rrfui:ial to bn:;r "tt<'h ~~ 
jf1dgnwut on ~lnftmp; mrch<"al <Opm1ono, 
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employable and present no more risk than applicants from 
the general population. 
Though petitioners' argument here is primarily an attack 
upon the factfinding below, the Court does not directly accept 
that thesis. Instead, it concludes that the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals both misapplied the Equal Protection 
Clause. On the fa.cts as found, however, one can reach the 
Court's result only if that Clause imposes no real constraint 
at all in this situation. 
The question before us is the rationality of placing success-
fully maintained or recently cured persons in the same cate-
gory as those just attempting to escape heroin addiction or 
who have failed to escape it instead of in with the general 
population.6 The asserted justification for the challenged 
cl!fssification is the objective of a capable and reliable work 
force , and thus the characteristic in question is employability. 
"Employability," in this regard, does not mean that any par-
ticular applicant, much less every member of a given group 
of applicants, will turn out to be a model worker. Nor does 
it mean that no such applicant will ever become or be dis-
covered to be a malingerer, thief, alcoholic, or even heroin 
addict. All employers take such risks. Employability, as the 
District Court used it in reference to successfully maintained 
methadone users, means only that the employer is no more 
likely to find a member of that group to be an unsatisfactory 
employee than he would an employee chosen from the general 
population . 
Petitioners had every opportunity, but presented nothing to 
negative the employability of successfully maintained metha-
done users as distinguished from those who were unsuccessful. 
"The rulr ';:; trf•atment of thu~e who succred iH at is~ue here, since the 
Distnct Court effectivd:1· amended the complaint to allege di;:;criminatiun 
agamst that Hubgroup, st'e Fed. Hule Civ. Proc . 15 (b) , and implicitly 
found .no eou~tituhon:d violatiou with n'~pert to others burclenrd by the 
prae1ii'P. 
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Instead, petitioners, like the Court, dwell on the methadone 
failures-those who quit the programs or who remain but 
turn to illicit drug use. The Court, for instance, makes much 
of the drug use of many of those in methadone programs, 
including those who have been in such programs for more 
than one year. Ante, at 6. But this has little force since 
those persons are not "successful," can be and have been iden-
tified as such, see id., at 5.7 and are not within the protection 
of the District Court's injunction. That 20 to 30%, are unsuc-
cessful after one year in a methadone program tells us nothing 
about the employability of the successful group, and it is the 
latter category of applicants that the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals held to be unconstitutionally burdened by 
the blanket rule disqualifying them from employment. 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals were therefore 
fully justified in finding that petitioners could not reasonably 
have concluded that the protected group is less employable 
than the general population and that excluding it "has no 
rational relation to the demands of the jobs to be per-
formed." 8 399 F. Supp., at 1057. In fact, the Court assumes 
that petitioners' policy is unnecessarily broad in excluding the 
successfully maintained and the recently cured, id., at 19, and 
that a member of that group can be selected with adequate 
preCisiOn. l d., at 5. Despite this, the validity of the exclu-
sion is upheld ou the rational basis of the uninvolved portion 
7 The t->vidence indieate>s that Jloor risks will shah out of a mPthadone-
maintcnanc(· program within ::;ix months . 399 F. Supp .. a,t 1048. It is a 
mewmre of thP Di~trict Court's caution that it Het a one-year standard. 
8 A major sponsor of the recent amendmruts to the Hehabilitation Act, 
i:>Pe ante, at 10-11, and n. Hi, described the> congres1:1ional dete>rmination 
behind thPm H8 being thai a public employer "cannot as::;urne that a history 
of alcoholi;;m or drug addiction, includmg a pa::;i addiction currPntly treated 
by mrthadone maintpnance, pose's suffic1rnt danger in and of it;;elf to 
justify exclu~ion I from employment 1. Such an m;::;umption would have 
no basi:-; in fact "' 124 Cong. Rrr. S19002 (Sen. William;;) (dail.y ('d. 
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of the rule, that is, that the rule excludes many who are less 
employable. But petitioners must justify the distinction be-
tween groups, not j]Jst the policy to which they have attached 
the classification. The purpose of the rule as a whole is 
relevant only if th~ classification within the rule serves the 
purpose, but the majority's assumption admits that is not so. 
Justification of the blanket exclusion is not furthered by 
the statement that "any special rule short of total exclu-
sion .. . is likely to be less precise than the one that [petition-
ers] currently enforce [ ] ." I d., at 18. If the rule were nar-
rowed as the District Court ordered, it would operate more 
precisely in at least one respect. for many employable persons 
would no longer be excluded. Nor does the current rule pro-
vide a "bright line," for there is nothing magic about the 
point five years after treatment has ended. There is a risk of 
"regression'' among those who have never used methadone, 
and the Court cannot overcome the District Court's finding 
that a readily ascertainable point exists at which the risk has 
so decreased that the maintained or recently cured person is 
generally as employable as auyone else." 
Of course. the District Court's order permitting total ex~ 
elusion of all methadone users maintained for less than one 
year, whether successfully or 11ot, would still exclude some 
employables and would to this extent be overinclusive. "Over-
inclusiveness" as to the primary objective of employability 
is accepted for Jess successful methadone users because it ful~ 
fills a secondary purpose and thus is not "overinclusive" at 
all. See Vance v. Bradley, - U. S. --, - (1979). Al-
though many of those who have not been successfully main~ 
tained for a year are employable. as a class they, milike the 
" Though a prr~un frre of illiCJt drug usr fur one ~· ear might ~ubse­
quently n'v('rt. thol:ie who have graduated from methadone program:; might 
do :<o al~o, and the Court apparently believe<i that the employment <>xclu-
~JOn roHid not ro nHt Jtutionally be extencied to them. Se<> aute. at :3 n. ;j, 
;md 19 n ;{4 , 
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~protected group, are not as employable as the general popula~ 
tion. Thus, even assuming the bad risks could be identified, 
serving the end of employability would require unusual efforts 
to determine those more likely to revert. But that legitimate 
secondary goal is not fulfilleJ by-exCluding the protected class: 
The District Court found that the fact of successful participa~ 
tion for one year could be discovered through petitioners' nor~ 
mal screening process without additional effo'rt and, I repeat, 
that those who meet that criterion are no more-likely ' than the 
average applicant to turn out to be a poor employee. to Ac~ 
cordingly, the rule 's classification of successfully maintained 
persons as dispositively different from the general population 
is left without any justification and, with its irrationality and 
invidiousness thus uncovered, must fail before the Equal Pro~ 
tection Clause. n 
1" Siner thr Di~trict Court foun·d a~ a ' fnct, and the Court doe~ not deny, 
that the bad ri~kH could be culled from thi~ group through the normal 
proc<•s,;ing or employment applications, tlw onl~· po~siblr justificntion for 
tbi~ rule iH that it rliminatE't> application~ .in which petitioners would 
inve;;t :some time and effort before finding the perHon unemployable. tho 
problem, howf•ver, i~ that not everyone in the general population is em-
ployable . Thu~, if vacancie~ are to be filled, individualized hiring deci:sion~ 
must br made• in any event . 
The fact of nwthadonr u:;e must br determined somehow, so all applica-
t wn::; mu:st at lea::;t be rrad, aud petitioners requirr all applicants under :35 
to ::;ubrnit lo urinalysi,.; . Heading the application:; may disclo~r not only 
the fact of methadone m;e but abo whrther the pPrs::m has certain edura-
twnal or other qualification~ and whethrr he or she has had a ~table 
employment t>xperiPnce or any recent job-rt>lated difficultie~. 
u I have difficulty aiHo with the Court'~ ea::;y conclusion that the chal-
]Pnged rule was " [qJuitt- plainly" not motivated ''by any special animus." 
Ante. at 20-21, n. 37. Ht>roin nddirtion io; a special problem of the poor, 
and thP addict population IS cornpo~ed largely of racial rninoritie:s that the 
Court ha:s previou~ly recogmzcd a::; politically powerless and historically 
subjects of majoritanan neglect. Person:; on methadone maintenancr have 
few mtere~tH in common with member:; of thr majority. and 11m~ arr 
tmlikely to have their intere:,;t~ protected, or rvrn con::;idered, in govern-
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Finally, even were the District Court wrong, and success-
fully maintained perso11s margillally less employable than the 
rea~ous for the ... drug policy i~ the fact that l' petitiOIJPr~J feelL] an 
adverse public reaction would re~ult if it were generally known that Lpeti-
tiorwr~ I employed prr::;un::i with a prior history of drug abu:sr, including 
pero>Ollti participatiug in methadone maintenance program;;." App. 83A. 
It iH hard fur me to reconcilr that stipulation of animus againHt former 
addict,; with our pa;;t holding::; that "a bare ... desirr to harm a politically 
uupopular group cannot constitute a legitimatr governmental interrst ." 
U.S. Dept of Agriculture \'. Mor·eno. 41:3 U.S. 528, 534 (197:3). On thr 
otbrr hand, t hr affliction::; to which prtitionrrH arr more ~ympathetic, such 
a;; aleoholl!Sm and mrntal ilht<'HH, arr ;;bared by both white and black, rich 
and poor. 
Somr wright ::;hould also he givPll to the hi;;tory of thr rulr. Sl'<' Village 
of Arliii(Jtoll Heights v. Metrupulitau Housing Dev. Corp., 429 ll. S. 25:2, 
267-2()1.; ( 1977). Prtitionpr::; admit that it was not thr re::;ult of a rra::;oned 
policy decision and stipulatrd that they had never studied tlw ability of 
those ou methadone maint rnanc(• to perform pet itionero;' jobs. Petitioner~ 
arc not dirPctl~- aceountablr to t hr public, an• not thr type of officml bod~­
tltqt normally make,; legJ::ilativr judgment~ of fact such a~ thosr relied 
upon by the majority today, and are by natun• morP concPmPd with 
bu::;ine~H efficirnc~· than with other public policies for which thry have no 
d1rect rc~pon:::;ibilit~·. Cf. Harnpto11 \'. Mote Sun Wong, 42(i 11. S. 88, 103 
(19ifi). But srl' ante. at 20. Both tlw Statr ;md City of Nrw York, 
which do rxhibit thosr democratic eharach•riRttr~, birr per:;om; in metha-
done program~ for ~imilar job~. 
The~r fact or~ logrt her ~trongl~· point to a concluo;ion of iHvJdiou::> di:;-
criminatwn. The Comt, howrvPr , rpfuo>es to vi<'w !hi:; rulr as one ''circum-
t>eribf ing] a eta:;;; of prrHon~ characterizrd by somP unpopular trait or 
affiliation •· hecausP 1t 1:::; admitted!~· ju~tifird as applied to many currrnt 
aucl former herom acldJct::;. Becau::ic tl1P challrngrcl cla,;o;ifieation unfairly 
burdens ouly a o;mall portion of all heroin addJCto>, thr Court rt>a~on;; that 
it cannot possibly havP brrn H]Htrrecl by animu~ by tlw "ruling majority." 
Ali that show,;, howpvrr, i:s that thr charactPri~tic in ljurstion i~ a legiti-
matr lm~iH of dio;tinction in o;omP eirctun:;tanCPH; lwrom addtction i~ a :;eri-
ou:s afHJctiun that will oftrn affrct Pmpluyabilit~·. But ~ometimr,; antipathy 
exten(b bryoncl tlw facts that may have givru fl~<' to it. and when that 
happrnH thP ''o; tprrotyprd J'<•achon nm~- havr 110 rational rrlation~hip­
uthPr than JHlrP prPjuclirud di~crimmation-to tht> statrd purpose for which 
fhe cla::;s!fiealion i~ hemg mad!' ." Mathews \'.Lucas, -!27 LT. 8. 495, 520-
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-average applicant,12 the blanket exclusion of only these people. 
when but a few are actually unemployable and when many 
other groups have varying numbers of unemployable mem-
bers, is arbitrary and uncOIJstitutiona1. Many persons now 
suffer from or may again suffer from some handicap related 
to employability.1 R But petitioners have singled out respond-
ents-unlike exoffenders. former alcoholics and mental 
patients, diabetics, epileptics. and those currMtly using tran-
quilizers. for example-for sacrifice to this at best ethereal 
and likely 11onexistent risk of increased unemployability. 
uch an arbitrary assignment of burdens among classes that 
are similarly situated with respect to the proferred objectives 
is the type of iuvidious choice forbidden ·by t!Ye Equal Protec-
tion Clause.11 
5:21 {1977) (rh~:;rntmg opinion) (footnote omittrd). That is the cn':-ie 
here . 
12 Th(' Distriet Court found that ihr orily common phy:-;ical pffrct~ ol 
methadon<-' maintenance are incrrns<'8 in swratiug, iu:;omnia, and COIIH1ipn-
twn, and a clrrrra~e in ~rx clrivl'. 399 F. Supp., nt 1044-1045. 1'ho:<<' 
di~abihtir::; are unfortunate but ar<· hardly relatrd to inabilit~· to br a :stib-
way janitor. This Court hint::; that tht> rmplo~·ability of evt>n tho~E' sur-
CE'H~full~· bt>tng maiutaint>d on mPthadone might be rE>clucrd by thE'ir obliga-
tion to appear at thE'ir climes thrre ttme:s a week. Ante. at 17 11. :lO. But 
all employe<'" have out~idr obligation:;, and petitioner~ have 1wither are;urd 
nor proven that th1::~ par!Jcular dut~· would mtt>rfrre with work. 
The D1strict Court d1d find that a po:;sible but rare effect of mrthadoJH' 
i~ minor impairment of abilitw~ "requirrd for i he performance of poten-
tially hazardou~ ta~k:;, :;uch a~ driving a car or opemting machinery," 890 
F. Supp., at 1045, and the court exemptPd from the relief orderrd Huch 
positiou~ a:s ~ubway motorman. which require "unique ;,;en:sit ivity." ld., 
at 1052. Bnt thi:; doe~ not make rational the blanket exrlu:;iou from em-
ployment, rPgardless of tlw qualifications "<'qmred. 
laThe Di~tnct Court found, and petitioner~ have not challenged. that 
currrnt prolJlem drmker:; prr~eut morE' of an employment nsk than do 
rt>spondrnt:s. PetJtJoJwr;:; do not automat1eally cli:-;rharge rmplo~·ee;; who 
arp found to haw a drinkmg ]>rohlPm. 
1• Tlw Court argue:; that •'tlw fart that [pC'tttioner.- have] the re;:;ourrr:< 
:ro exJH•nd on on<· ria~" of problem Pntployr<'li dors not by 1t"elf eRtahlish 11 
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con~titutional duty on [thPirl part to come up with resource~ to :;pend 
on all rlasses of problem employee::;.'' Ante, at 19 n. 34. If respondents 
wrre demanding to have the benefit of a rehabilitation program extended 
to them, petitioners could perhaJlS argue for frerdom to deal with only 
onP problem at a timr due to limited resources. See Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 41:-\9 (1955). In that situation. ihe lack of 
resources. or the desire to experimrnt in 11 limitrd field, might be a legiti-
mate objectiYe explaining the rla~::;ifiration. But respondPnts are not ask-
mg for ::;peeial, beneficial treatment; they are n~king why they should br 
nl)solutrly excluded froln the opportunity to compete for petitioners' jobs. 
February 6, 1979 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ro. 77-1427 
New York. City Tra11sit Authority l 011 "~rit of Certiorari to 
Pt al., Petitiotwrs. the United States Court 
1.1, of Ap]wals for the Sec-
Carl A Beazer et aL ond Cireuit. 
[February ~, 1979J 
MR. JusncM STEVEN~ delivered the opinion of the Court. ~-­
The Nf'w York Trausit Authority refuses to employ persons 
who use methadone. The District Court found that this 
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteeuth 4 ~ 
Amendment. In a subsequent opiniou. thE' court also held ~ L ~--~~ 
that the policy violatt>s Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of ~ • 
1964. ,.he Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the 
statutory questiOn. The departure by those courts from the J lffl,.•""-' 
procedure normally followed in addressing statutory and con- ,;--
stitutioual questions i11 thf' same case. as well as concern that/.2..~ ~ I 
the merits of theS(' mtportant questions had been decided 
erroneously, leu us to grant eertioran.1 - r S ·---. We · 
now rt'ver·s~. ~ ~ '1.:...,... tM 
- ~ ..J-t Huk 19 or tlH· Hull':- ol lhr t-ltiJH'Plll(' Comt provicJp,., : ~··~ 
'('0N8JDEHATJONS <fOVFH~I\G HE\'lEW OX CEHTlOH IU • A 4 ~ ~111~ '· I A rPviev. on \I Tit of <'<•rtwrnn .,., not a m:<l tPr of nght. but of :;onnd 
Jndtcial dt~r·rPttun, and \nil lw g:raniPd onl~· whPrP th<·n· arP "JlPCial nne! ~ _ -~ ..,. 
important fi'HHOil~ thPn•for ThP followmg. wlllll' nPttlwr c·tmtrolling :nor~ 11""'0 
fulh. llll':t"un.ng tltt· c·t·H·trl ~ ch~r·t'Nwn, mdH·:tiP tlw rhar:tl'll't' of rra~on~ ~t--~ 
whil'h wlll Jw c·o!lstdrorc•tl: / .:=-::--
''(1.) \VIH'rt· a <'Oitrl of' appP:d' ha~ tleeidPcl a t'Pdrral qur"tion in a P'f ~~ ~; 
W:.t) iu I'Onfhrt wtth apJ>heable deet,;ton::; of tl11~ eourt; or ha" 1'50 far de-
pnrtf'cl from lh<· a<·c·Pptrd nnd ttRll:tl r·our"P of )Udtrtal pror·eeding,.,, or .so 
.. 
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The Transit Authority (TA) operates the subway system 
and certain bus lines in New York City. It employs about 
47,000 persons, of whom many-perhaps most--are employed 
in positions that iuvolve danger to themselves or to the public. 
For example, some 12,300 are subway motormen, towermen, 
conductors, or bus operators. The District Court found that 
these jobs are attended by unusual hazards and must be per-
formed by "persons of maximum alertness and competence.'' 
399 F. Supp. 1033, 1052. Certain other jobs. such as oper-
ating cranes and handling high voltage equipment, are als.o 
consider0d "critical," or "safety sensitive." while still others, 
though classified as "non-critical," have a potentially impo~;· 
tant impact on the overall operation of the transportation 
system.2 
TA e11forces a general policy against employing persons 
who use narcotic drugs. The policy is reflected in Rule 11 (b) 
of TA's Rules and Regulations. 
''Employees must not use, or have in their possession, 
narcotics. tranquilizers. drugs of the Amphetamine group 
or barbiturate dNivatives or paraphernalia used to ad-
munster narcotics ot· barbiturate derivatives, except with 
Lhe writte11 permission of the Medical Director-Chief 
Surgeon of the System. ?? 
Methadone is regarded as a narcotic within the meaning of 
Rule 11 (b). No written prrmission has ever been given by 
T A's Medical Director for the employment of a person using 
methadoue,l< 
far Kanctwned such n departure hy a lower court, as to call for an exer~ 
cb<> of th1s court·~ ,.;upervi8wn." 
2 Tim~, about 13,400 !'mplo~w·~ are involvl•d in t hr maintrnance of 
::;uuway cars, bU8<'~. tr:wk, tunnrl~, and structurrs. Anoth€'r 5,600 work in 
subway Htatwns, and ovrr 2,000 nrc !;'ngaged in offirr ta~ks that include 
the handling of large ~;ums of money TA hires about 3,000 new employees 
eaeh year 
3 By 1t~ !!'rm~, Hule 11 (h) doeH not apply to p!'r~ons who formerly 
~113ed mrthadon1• or. any otlwr drug, und the Di;.;trict Court did. not find: 
77-1427-0PINION 
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The District Court found that methadone is a synthetic 
narcotic and a central nervous system depressant. If injected 
into the blood stream with a needle, it produces essentially 
the same effects as heroin! Methadone has been used legiti-
that TA had any general policy covering former u~;ers. On the contrary, 
the court found that "[fJhe situation is not entirely clear with respect to 
the policy of the TA regarding personi:l who have successfully concluded 
participation in a methadone program." 399 F. Supp., at 1036. 
Although it did not settle the question of what policy TA enforces in 
thb rP,;pect, the District Court mcluded former users in the plaintiff 
ela;;s. It then afforded them rehef from any blanket exclusionary policy 
that TA might enforce, although, agnin, the supporting factual findings 
were admittedly "not [based on] a great deal" of evidence. Ja., at 1051. 
TA contends that the meager Pvidenee rece1ved at trial on tlw "former 
users" 1ssue was insufficient to support either the class or relief deterrnina-
tlonll made w1th respeet to tho;;e persons. We go further. As far as we 
a1·e aware there was no evidenr·e offered at trial, and certainly none relied 
upon by tlw D1stnct Court, t11at TA actually refused employment to any 
former u:>er rntitl<>d to relief under the injunction ordered by that court. 
( It ~~ not clPar tlmt the on<> named plaintiff who was a form<>r user when l 
the ('omplamt was filPd was a former user at the time lw applied for a 
job with TA, in any cnse, he had not completrd a full year of mrthadone 
maintmancr and could thereforP lw exeluded under the Di~:;trict Court's 
injunction . Sre post, at n . 12.) 
It follows that neither the finding~ of fact, nor the record evidence, 
'quarely presents any issue with respect to former users that must be 
resolved in order to dispose of tlus litigation. A policy excluding all 
former users would be harder to .JUstify than a policy applicable only to 
persons currently receiving treatment. A comt ~:;hould not reach out to 
express an opinion on the constitutiOnality of such a policy unless necessary 
to adjud1cate a roncrete dispnte between adver:;p litigants. We shall there-
fore confine our consideration to the legality of TA's enforcement of its 
Rule 11 (b) against cwTeu t users of met had one. 
4 "Herom i~ a narcotic which is' genPrally mjected into the bloodl:ltream 
by a nePdle. It I~> a central nervous system depressant. The usual effect 
i" to crPntP a 'h1gh '-euphoria, drowsiness-for about thirty minut!:'i:l, which 
then tapers off over a penod of about thre<> or four hourH. At the end of 
this tune the heroin user experience;; oncknes~; and discomfort known as 
withdrawal ::;ymptoms.' Then· i:; unense craving for another o;hot of 
heroin, aft('r whJCh the cycle start:; over agam. A typiral addict will inject 
heroin several tmws a dav '' ;~99 F Supp , at 10:38 
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mately ln at least three ways-as a pain killer, in "detoxifica-
tion units" of hospitals as an immediate means of taking 
addicts off of heroin," and in long range "methadone mainte-
nance programs" as pa.rt of a permanent cure for heroin 
addiction. See 21 CFR § 310.304 (b) (1978). In such pro-
grams the methadone is taken orally in regula.r doses for a 
prolonged period. As so administered, it does not produce 
euphoria or any pleasurable effects associated with heroin; on 
the contrary, it prevents users from experiencing those effects 
when they i1iject heroin, and also alleviates the severe and 
prolonged discomfort otherwise associated with an addict's 
disco11tinuance of the use of heroin. 
About 40,000 persons receive methadone maintenance treat-
ment in New York City, of whom about 26.000 participate 
in the five major public or semi-public programs,n and 14,000 
o The Dbtrict Court found thnt detoxification is accompli~hed "by 
switching a heroin addict to methadone and gradually reducing the doses 
of methadone to zero over a period of about thret> weeks. The patient 
thns dctoxifi<>d is dmg frt>e. Moreover, it is hoped' that the program of 
gradnally reduced dose::; of methadone leaves him without the withdrawaT 
symptons, or tlw 'phyHical dependence' on a narcotic.'• 399 F. Supp., at 
1038. 
6 "The five major public or sem1-public methadone· maintenance pro-· 
grams in New York City are : 
" (1) Beth Israel program . .. with 33 clinics treati'ng 7100 patients; 
" (2) A program administered by tlie City of New York with 39 clinics• 
' treating 12,400 patients (hereafter referred' to as 'tlie City program'); 
" (3) A progrnm administered by the Bronx State Hospital and the Albert 
Ein~tein College of Medicine, with 7 clinics trt>ating about 2400 patients; 
" (4) A program operated by the Addiction Research and Treatment Cen-
ter (ARTC) with 6 clinics trt>atmg about 1200 patients; and 
" (5) A program operated by the New York State Drug Abuse Control 
' Commission (DACC) , with 8 climcl:' trt>ating about 1100 patients. 
"The total number of pat1ent~ treated in public or Ht>mi-public programs• 
ls about 26,000. It appears that these programs are financed almos..t: 
entirely by ft>deral, .state and city funds." 399 F. Supp., at 104Q . 
• , 1 
.· 
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are involved in about 25 private programs.7 The sole purpose 
of all these programs is to cure the addiction of persons who 
have been using heroin for at least two years. 
Methadone maintenance treatment in New York is largely 
governed by regulations promulgated by the New York Drug 
Abuse Control Commission. Under the regulations, the newly 
accepted addict must first be detoxified, normally in a hospital. 
A controlled daily dosage of methadone is then prescribed. 
The regulations require tha.t six doses a week be administered 
at a clinic, while the seventh day's dose may be taken at 
home. If progress is satisfactory for three months, additional 
doses may be taken away from the clinic, although through~ 
out most of the program. which often lasts for several years, 
there is a minimum requirement of three clinic appearances a 
week. During these visits, the patient not only receives his 
doses but is also counseled and tested for illicit use of drugs.8 
The evidence indicates that methadone is an effective cure 
7 "[V]ery little specific information was provided [at trial] r~garding 
the private clinics." 399 F. Supp., at 1046. What evidence there was 
indicated that tho~e clinic~ were likely to be less successful and less able 
to provide accurate mformation about their clients than the public clinics. 
Id., at 1046, 1050. 
8 Although the Unit1:>d State8 Food and Drug Administration has also 
issued regulations in this area, 21 CFR §§ 291.501, 291.505 (1978), the 
New York State regulations are a:; or more stringent and thus effectively 
set the relevant standards for the authorized methadone maintenance pro-
grams mvolved in this case. Under those regulations, in-clini~ ingestion 
of methadone must be observed by staff members, NYCRR § 2021.13 (b), 
and must occur with a frequency of six days a week during the first three 
months, no less than three days a week thereafter through the second year 
of trPatment, and two days a week thereafter. !d., §2021.13(a)(l). 
Tests art' required to prevent hoardmg of take-home dose~, exce:;sive use 
of nwthadone, and illicit use of other drugs or alcohol, any of which, if 
found, can result in mcreased cJmic-VISit frequency OJ' in termination from 
the program. !d., §§2021.13 (c)(2), 20'21.13 (g). The programs are also 
required to include ''a comprehensive range of rehabilitative service::; on-site 
under profe~s10nal supervisiOn," id, § 2021.13 (3), although participation 
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for the physical aspects of heroin addiction. But the District 
Court also found "that many persons attempting to overcome· 
heroin addiction have psychological or lifestyle problems 
which reach beyond what can be cured by the physical taking 
of doses of methadone." 399 F. Supp., at 1039. The crucial 
indicator of successful methadone maintenance is the patient's 
abstinence from the illegal or excessive use of drugs and 
alcohol. The District Court found that the risk of reversion 
to drug or alcohol abuse declines dramatically after the first 
few months of treatment. Indeed, "the strong majority" of 
patients who have been on methadone maintenance for at 
least a year are free from illicit drug use.9 But a significant 
number are not. On this critical point, the evidence relied 
upon by the District Court reveals that even among partici-
pants with more than 12 months' tenure in methadone main-
tenance programs, the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse 
may often approach and even exceed 25%?11 
This litigation was brought ·by the four respondents as a 
class action on behalf of all persons who have been, or would 
in the future be, subject to discharge or rejection as employees 
of TA by reason of participation in a methadone maintenance 
program. Two of the respondents are former employees of 
9 "I conclude from all the evidence that the strong majority of metha-
done maintained persons are successful, at least after the initial period of 
adjustment, in keeping themselve:s free of the use of heroin, other illicit 
drugs, and problem dririkmg." 6'99 F . Supp., at 1047. 
10 Thus, for example : 
"Dr. Tngg of Beth Israel testified that about 5,000 out of the 6,500-7,000 
patients in his clinics have been on methadone maintenance for a year or 
more. He further testified that 75% of this 5,000 are free from illicit drug 
·use " 399 F . Supp., at 1046. 
Similarly, although the figure:; may be somewhat higher for the City and 
Bronx State Hospital programs, only 70% of the ARTQ patients w1th a 
vear'~ tenure or more were found to be free from illicit drug or alcohol 
use It is rea:;ona.ble to infer from this E'vidence that anywhere from 20 
to 30% of those who have been on maintenance for over .a year have 
·drug or alcohol prohletm•" 
..... , 
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TA who were dismissed while they were receiving methadone 
treatment.11 The other two were refused employment by TA, 
one both shortly before and shortly after the successful con-
clusion of his methadone treatment,12 and the other while he 
was taking methadone.1 ' Their complaint alleged that TA's 
blanket exclusion of all former heroin addicts receiving meth-
adone treatment was illegal under the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000 et seq., and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The trial record contains extensive evidence concerning the 
success of methadone maintenance programs, the employ-
ability of persons taking methadone, and the ability of pro-
spective employers to detect drug abuse or other undesirable 
characteristics of methadone users. In general, the District 
Court concluded that there are substantial numbers of meth-
11 Re~pondent Beazer was dismissed in November 1971 when his heroin 
addiction became known to TA and shortly after he enrolled in a metha-
done maintenance program; he succe~:~~;fully terminated his treatment in 
November 1973. Rei:>pondent Reye~ began his methadone treatment in 
1971 and was dismissed by TA in 1972. At the time of trial, in 1975, he 
was still participating in a methadone program. 
12 Respondent Frasier was on methadone maintenance for only five 
months, from October 1972 until March 1973. TA refused to employ him 
as a but:~ operator in March 1973 and as a bus cleaner in April 1973. 
Fl"'asier did not participate in a methadone program for even half a year. 
Moreover, he t,ested positively for methadone us<> at the time of his March 
application and only a few weeki:> before his April application was rejected 
under Rule 11 (b) . See 399 F . Supp., at HKH ; App., at 32A. Under 
these circumstances, the District Court's characterization of Frazier as a 
' former '' u:ser at the time he applied, and its inclusion of Frazier in the 
group of "tenured" methadone users for whom it felt relief was appro-
priate under the Equal Protection Clause, see n. 32, infra, are without 
apparent Justification 
13 Respondent D~az entered a methadone maintenance program in 
December 1968 :md was still receiving treatment at the time of trial. He 
was refuRed employment as a mttintenance helper in 1970" 
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adone users who are just as employable as other members of 
the general population and that normal personnel screening 
procedures-at least if augmented by some method of obtain-
ing information from the staffs of methadone programs-would 
enable TA to identify the unqualified applicants on an indi-
vidual basis. 399 F. Supp., at 1048-1051. On the other 
hand, the District Court recognized that at least one-third of 
the persons receiving methadone treatment-and probably a 
good many more-would unquestionably be classified as 
unemployable.14 
After extensively reviewing the evidence, the District Court 
briefly stated its conclusion that TA's methadone policy is 
unconstitutional. The conclusion rested on the legal proposi-
tion that a public entity "cannot bar persons from employ-
ment on the basis of criteria which have no rational relation 
to the dema11ds of the JOb to be performed." 399 F. Supp., 
at 1057. Because it is clear that substantial numbers of 
methadone users are capable of performing many of the jobs 
at T A, the court held that the Constitution will not tolerate a 
blanket exclusion of all users from all JObs. 
The District Court enjoined TA from denying employment 
to any person solely because of participation in a methadone 
1 • The Dbtrict Court summarized the t~stimony concerning one of the 
large::;t ~Uld most ::;uccessful public programs : 
"The witnes::;es from the Beth Israel program testified that about one-
third of the patients m that program, after a short period of adjustment, 
need very little more than the doses of methadone. The prrsons in this 
category arr situated fairly sati::;factonly with respect to matters such 
as family ties, educatiOn and job~. Another one-third of the patient::; at 
Beth I~rael need a moderatr amount of rehabilitation st-rvice, including 
vocational as::nstance, for a penod of ::;everal month::; or about a year. A 
person m th1s category may, for mstance, have finished high school, but 
may havr a long herom h1~tory and no employment record. A final one-
third of the patients at Beth Israel need mtens1w ::;upportive service::;, are 
performmg m the program marginally, and e1ther will be di::~charged or will 
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maintenance program. Recognizing, however, the special re-
sponsibility for public safety borne by certain T A employees 
and the correlation betwee~ longevity in a methadone main-
tenance program and performance capability, the injunction 
authorized TA to exclude methadone users from specific 
categories of safety-sensitive positions and also to condition 
eligibility on satisfactory performance in a methadone pro-
gram for at least a year. In other words, the court held that 
TA could lawfully adopt general rules excluding all methadone 
users from some jobs and a large number of methadone users 
from all jobs. 
Almost a year later the District Court filed a supplemental 
opinion allowing respondents to recover attorneys fees under 
42 U. S. C. ~ 2000e-5 (k). This determination was premised 
on the court's additional holding that TA's drug policy vio-
lated Title VII. Having already concluded that the blanket 
exclusion was not rationally related to any business needs of 
TA, the court reasoned that the sta.tute is violated if the 
exclusionary policy has a discriminatory effect against blacks 
and Hispanics. That effect was proven, in the District Court's 
view, by two statistics: ( 1) of the employees referred to T A's 
medical consultant for suspected violation of its drug policy, 
81% are black or Hispanic; (2) between 62% and 65<fo of all 
methadone maintained persons in New York City are black or 
Hispanic. 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-279. The Court, however, 
did not find that TNs policy was motivated by any bias 
against blacks or Hispanics; indeed, it expressly found that 
the policy was not adopted with a discriminatory purpose. 
ld., at 279. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's consti-
tutional holding. While it declined to reach the statutory 
issue, it also affirmed the award of attorneys fees under the 
aegis of the recently enacted Civil Rights Attorneys Fee 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. ~ 1988, which provides ade-
. .: 
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quate support for an award of legal fees to a party prevailing 
on a constitutional claim,15 
After we granted certiorari, Congress amended tlie Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 700 et seq., to prohibit 
discrimination against a class of "handicapped' individuals" 
that arguably includes certain former drug abusers. and certain 
current users of methadone. Pub. L. 95-251, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. Respondents argue that the amendment now mandates 
at least the prospective relief gra.nted by the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals and that we should therefore dis-
miss the writ as improvidently granted. We are satisfied, 
however, that we should decide the constitutional question 
presented by the petition. Before doing so, we shall discuss 
( 1) the effect .of the Rehabilitation Act on this case; and 
(2) the error in the District Court's analysis of Title VII. 
I 
Respondents contend that the recent amendment to § 7 (6) 
of the Rehabilitation Act proscribes TA's enforcement of. a 
general rule denying employment to methadone users.16 · Even 
15 The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court on one issue relat-
ing to relief The lower court had denied rein~:;tatement and back-pay 
rehef to two of the four named plaintiffi:i because they admitted having 
v10lated TA's unquestiOnably valid rule against taking- heroin while being 
in TA's employ. Pet . for Cert., at 77a-78a. The Court of Appeals re-
versed. It determined that the two plaintiffs' former heroin. use and viola-
tion of T A's rult'i:i on that account were irrelevant because T A explicitly 
premised their firmg exclusively on their use of methadone. 558 F. 2d 
97, at 101. 
16 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S. C. § 794, provides: 
" t.o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as 
' defined in section 706 (6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the partiCipation 111, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subJected to discnminatwn under any program or activity receiving; 
Federal financial assistance " 
It i~ stipulated that the TA receives federal financial assi~tanc11.. 
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if respondents correctly interpret the amendment, and even 
if they have a right to enforce that interpretation,17 the case 
is not moot since their claims arose even before the act itself 
was passed/8 and they have been awarded monetary relief. 10 
Moreover, the language of the statute, even after its amend-
ment, is not free of ambiguity/0 and no administrative or 
In relevant part,§ 7 (6) of the Act, 29 U.S. C.§ 706 (6), as amended, 
provides· 
"The term 'handicapped individual' . .. mp,ans any person who (A) has 
a phyHical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more 
of such person's maJOr life activitJes, (B) has a record of such an impair-
ment, or (C) 1s regarded as having such an impairment. 
' .. For purposes of 8ections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to 
employment, such term does not includr any individual who is an alcoholic 
or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drug:; prevents such individ-
ual from prrforming the dutws of the job in question or whose employ-
ment, by rea:son of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a 
direct threat to property or the safety of others." 
17 The question whether a cause of action on behalf of handicapped 
persons may be implied under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act will be 
addressed by th1s Court in Southe(J)Stern Community College v. Davis, 
No. 78-711, C'ert. granted Jan. 8, 1979. 
18 The latest act of alleged di:scrimination c1ted in respondents' complaint 
occurred 111 Apnl 1973, while the Act was passed on September 26, 1973, 
Pub. L. 93-112, Title V, and the amendment to § 7 (6) went into effect in 
November 6, 1978. 
10 Seen. 17, supra. 
~ 0 In order for the D1strict Court 's findings to bring the respondent class 
conclusively within the Act, we would have to find that denying employ-
ment to a methadone user because of that use amounts to excluding an 
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . solely by reason of h1s 
handicap." Among other issues, this would require us to determine 
(1) whether heroin addicts or current methadone u:ser:; qualify as "handi-
capped indJvtdual[::;] "-i. e., whether that addiction or use Js (or is 
perceived a:s) a "phystcal Impairment winch substanttally limit8 one or 
more . . major hfe functions " , (2) whether methadone use prevents the 
indivtdual ''from performmg the duties of the job" or "would constitute a 
direct threat to property or the safety of others"; aud (3) whether the 
members of the respondent cla::;s are "otherwtse qua!ified"-the meaning of 
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judicial opinions specifically considering the impact of the 
statute on methadone users have been called to our attention. 
Of greater importance, it is perfectly clear that however we 
might construe the Rehabilitation Act, the concerns that 
prompted our grant of certiorari would still merit our atten-
tion.21 We therefore decline to give the statute its first judi-
cial construction at this stage of the litigation. 
H 
Although respondents have consistently relied ori both stat-
utory and constitutional claims, the lower courts focused 
primarily on the latter. Thus, when the District Court 
decided the Title VII issue, it did so only as an afterthought 
in order to support an award of attorneys fees; the Court of 
Appeals did not even rea.ch the 'Title VII issue. We do not 
condone this departure from settled federal practice. "If 
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in 
the process of constitutional adjudica.tion, it is that we ought 
not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such 
adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Co. v. M c-
Laughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105. Before deciding the constitu-
tional question, it was incumbent on those courts to consider 
which phrase is at issue in Southeastem Community College v. Davis, 
No. 78-711, cert. granted Jan. 8, 1979. 
21 See ante, at n. 1 and accompanying text. Respondents may exag-
gerate the degree to which the recent amendment altered the law as it 
existed when we granted certiorari. Even before the ·Court of Appeals 
beard argument in this case, in fact, the Attorney General of the United 
States had issued an interpretation of the Act as it then existed which 
concludt>d that the Act "doe::; in general prohibit discrimination against 
alcoholics and drug addicts in federally-a::;"istt>d programs .... " Opinion 
of the Honorable Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of t1w United States 
to Honorable Joseph A. Califano, Secretary, Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, Apnl 12, 1977. Respondent8 brought this Interpreta-
tion to our attention beforf' we granted certiorari. Brief in Opposition to 
·Certiorari~ at A5- A6, 
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whether the statutory grounds might be dispositive.22 What-
ever their reasons for not doing so/a we shall first dispose of 
the Title VII issue.24 
22 "From Rayburn's Case, 2 Da11. 409, to Alma Mot01· Co. v. Timken~ 
Detroit Axle Co. and the Hatch Act case dPcided tl1is term, this Court has 
followed a policy of strict neces:;ity in dispo::~ing of constitutional isSUf'S . 
The earheHt exemplification:;, too well known for repeating the hi:;tory here, 
arose in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions and in appli<'atiol'ls 
of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case allcl controversy 
limitatiOn. U S. Con:>t ., Art. III. . .• 
"The poh<'), howf'ver, has not been limited to jurisdictional determina-
tion~ . For, in addition, 'the Court [hasJ developed, for it~; own govPrn-
ance in the caHPt:i eonfr::~secll~ .. within its jurisdiction, a ~;eries of rules under 
which Jt has avmded pa:::smg upon a large part of nll the eont'tJtutional 
question:; pressed upon 1t for d<'cision .' Thus, as those rule:; wrre listed 
in support of the Htatement quoted, constitutio11nl is::~ueH affecting legisla-
tiOn will not be determilwd in friendly, nonadversary proceeding:;; in 
advance of the npces::~ity of dPcJding tlwm; in broadPr tC:'rms than are 
requirC:'d by th<' preci:se fac1H to which the ruling is to be applied; if the 
record presmts some otlwr ground upon wl1icl1 tl1e ca~C:' may be disposed 
of ; at the mstance of one who fails to ::~how that hr is injured by the 
statute'o operation, or who hn~ avuilrd himsrlf of its benrfit8; or if a ron-
structwn of the ~tatute is fairly po::;sible by wi11Ch the que~tion may be 
avoided." Re8cue Army v. Municipal Court, :331 U.S. 549, 568--569 (foot-
not<'~ omJtt<'d), quoting A8htcander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (Brandei:;, 
.T, roneurrmg) 
23 Respondent:,; Rugge:'it that the lower contt8 properly r<'arhC:'d the eon-
::;titutJonal issue firHt becau~Se only under the Equal Protrction Clause could 
all of the class m<'mbers, mcludmg wh1te methadone users (who pre-
sumably do not have standing in this ease nnd<'r Title VII or § 1981) 
obtain all of thP rrlief ineluding backpHy, Hought in their complaint. In 
addition, thC:'~· point to TA's argument that Title VII and § 1981 arP 
uncon~tJtutional inHofar a<> they authorize relirf againHt a ~-;tate subdivision 
without any direct allegation or proof of mtr.ntional di~cr1mination. Cf. 
Fitzpatnck v. Bitze1·, 427 U. S. 445 : National Leagup of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U. S. 83a: Washington Y. DaVIs, 426 P. S. 229; Fry v. United ::itates. 
421 U. S. 542, Katzenbaclt ' . ill organ, :~R4 U. S. 641. Under this latter 
point, it i~ arguPd that tlw D1~tmt Court quite properly derided to RddreRR 
[Footnote (i4 t.s 011 p 141 
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The District Court's findings do not support its conclusion 
that T A's regulation prohibiting the use of narcotics, or its 
interpretation of that regulation to encompass users of meth-
adone, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
A prima fa.cie violation of the A,ct may be established by 
·statistical evidence showing that an employment practice ·has 
the effect of denying the members of one race equal access to 
employment opportunities. Even assuming that respondents 
have crossed this threshold. the two statistics on which they 
and the District Court ·relied are incapable of proving that 
·TA 's rule had a disparate effect on blacks and Hispanics ·in 
violation of Title Vli.25 
the constitutionality of a municipal agency's hiring practices before 
addres::;mg the constitutionality of two Acts of Congress. 
Whatever the theoretical validity of respondents' explanations for the 
actions of the District Courf and the Court of Appeal~>, the fact remains 
that we are forced to speculate about what motivated thf'm becau~>e they 
never f'xplained their haste to address a naked constitutional issue despite 
· the presencf' in the case of alternative ~>tatutory theories. It al::;o bears 
notmg that in it~ second opinion the Di~>trict Court did decide that TA's 
policy vwlated a federal statute, and its decision, without addressing any 
constitutional issue, provided a statutory basis for virtually all of the relief 
that 1t ultimately awarded. Had it confronted the issue, therefore, it 
presumably would have concluded that it could have decided the case 
without addressmg the constitutional issue on which it initially decided the 
case. 
24 Although the exact applicability of § 1981 in cases such as this has not 
been deCided by this Court, and was not reached by either of the courts 
below, it seems clear that it affordi:i no greatt>r substantive protection 
than Title VII. Accordingly, our treatment of the Title VII claim also 
di:sposf's of the§ 1981 claim without need of a remand. 
25 "Statistics are ... competent in proving employment discrimination. 
We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite 
variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted . In 
short , their usefulness depend;; on all the surrounding facts and circum-
,;tauee:s." Teamsters v. United States , 431 U. S. 324, 339-340 (footnote 
omitted) . 
From the tmw thry filed their complaint until their :submissions to this I 
('ourt, rrspondrnt~ have l't'lied on ::;tati::;tic~; to demonf)trate the di$crimina-
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First, the District Court noted that 81% of the employees 
referred to TA's medical director for suspected violation of its 
narcotics rule were either black or Hispanic. But respondents 
have only challenged the rule to the extent that it is construed 
to apply to methadone users, and that statistic tells us 
nothing about the racial composition of the employees sus-
pected of using methadone.26 Nor does the record give us 
any information about the number of black, Hispanic, or 
white persons who were dismissed for using methadone. 
Second. the District Court · noted that about 63o/c of the 
persons in New York receiving methadone maintenance in 
publ-ic programs-i.e., 63o/r, of the 65ro of all New York City 
tory effect of TA's methadone policy. They have never attempted to 
present a discrimmatory purpose case and would be hard pressed to do so 
in the face of the District Court's explicit finding that no wJ, ammus 
motivated TA in establi:;hing its policy, 414 F. Supp., at 279, and in the 
face of TA 's demonstration in forms filed with the Equal Employmrnt 
Opportunity CommissiOn that thr percentage of blacks and Hispanics in 
it:> work force i:; well over twice that of the prrcentage in the work force 
in the New York metropolitan nrea . 
Because of our conclusion on the merits of respondents' Title VII claim. 
we need not address the con:;titutwnal challenge made by TA to Title VII 
insofar as it authorizes relief agamst a municipal agency under the cir-
cumstances of this case. SeP n. 23, supra. 
26 Indeed, it is probable that none of the employees comprising this 
81% were methadone users. The parties stipulated that: 
" T A employees showing phys1c.al manifestations of drug abuse other than 
the definite presence of morphine or rnethadone or other illicit drug in the 
urine are referred to [the medical director] for consultation . . .. " App., 
t 86A (emphasis added) 
In view of this stipulation and the District Court'8 finding that few if any 
physical manifestations of drug abuse characterize methadone maintained 
per8ons, 399 F. Supp., at 1042-1045, it seems likely that such persons 
would not be mcluded in the statistical pool referred to by the District 
Court . It should also be noted that when the di~sent refer~ to the rejec-
tion of almost 5% of all applicants "due to the rule," post. at 3, the refer-
ence iH to all narcotic;; users rather than to methadone users. The record 
does not tell u~ how many methadone users were rejected. I 
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methadone users who are in such programs 27-are black or 
Hispanic. We do not know. however. how many of these per-
sons ever worked or sought to work for TA. This statistic 
therefore reveals little if anything about the racial composi-
tion of the class of T A job applicants and rmployecs receiving 
methadone trE:>atment. Morf' particularly, it tells us nothing 
about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and em-
ployees who haw participated in methadone maintenance 
programs for over a year-the only class improperly excluded 
by TA's policy under the District Court's analysis. The 
rf'cord demonstrates. in faet. that the figure is virtually irrele-
vant bf'cause a substantial portion of the persons included in 
it are either unqualified for other reasons-such as the· illicit 
use of drugs and alcohol 2'-or have received successful assist-
anc<- m finc1mg jobs with employers othrr than TA.29 Finally, 
27 The ~tnti,.,ti<' rdird npon h~· thr Di:;lriet C'ourt wn~ drriv<·d from a 
;;ludy of mrthadone patients prrpared b:v a rc·~rarrher nt Hockefeller Uni-
vprsity based upon data snppliPd by thr public mrthadone clinics in New 
York. In that the District Court admittrdly rcrrivrd virtually no evi-
d<•nce nbout the privatr chnie~<, thPir funding, and ihrir partiripants, see 
aute, at n . 7, there iH no bmHH !'or n:<suming thnt the Hockefeller University 
~t1tiistie i8 applirahlc to p:1 rt U'Ipant~ in th<• privntc progmmR. 
2s To dcmon~trate rmplo~·abiht~·, thr Distrirt Court rrferred to a study 
inchrating that :34 to 59% of thr methadone u~er~ who have been in a, 
maintenance program for n Rubstnntial prriod of time are unemployed. 
Thr <'Vldencc WHii inronclusiYc with re:spect to all methadone u;;ers. 39!} 
} Snpp., at 1047. Howewr, the director of the ~rcond largest program 
in Nrw York City testified that onl~r 3~% of the entire methadone patient 
populatiOn Ill that program wen• emplo~rablc. Trial Tran:script, Janu-
ary 10, 1975, at 345. On the ~:;tatb;tic::; relating lo illicit uRe of drugs and 
nlcohol, ;;ee ante, at 7. 
211 Although "a r;tati~ticnl ;,;bowing of di><proportionate impact nrrd not 
n lway~ br ba~rd on an nnal~·''~"' of tlw rharactrri~ihcs of actual applictmts," 
Dothan! v. Ra1chnsou, 43:3 ll. 1:\. ;~:H, :3:{0, ''rvidenrr ~hawing that th(' 
figures for t hP gPll<'I'id popula t IOII might not acruratPI~· rdlrct t hr pool of 
qu:t hfiect JOb apphraut~ ·· Will rr ndrr the,:r figurr>< u~<'lr~,.; in making out a 
prnna fa('l<' easr ' TmmiSter.~ r Umted States, S1tpra, .J:n F. R., at 34{) 
r Z 
77-1427-0PINION 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. BEAZER 17 
we have absolutely no data on the 14,000 methadone users 
in the private programs, leaving open the possibility that the 
percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the class of methadone 
users is not significantly greater than the percentage of those 
minorities in the general population of New York City.30 
At best, respondents' statistical showing is weak; even if it 
is capable of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, 
it is assuredly rebutted by T A's demonstration that its nar-
cotics rule (and the rule 's application to methadone users) is 
"job related." 31 and by the District Court's express finding 
that the rule is not a pretext for intentional discrimination. 
414 F. Supp .. at 279. We conclude that respondents failed 
to prove a violation of Title VII. We therefore must reach _ 
the constitutional issue. 
III 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Clause 
3{) If all of the participants in private clinics are white, for example, then 
only about 40% of all methadone users would br black or Hispanic-com-
pared to the 36.3% of thr total population of 1\ew York that was black 
or Hispanic as of the 1970 census. Assuming instead that the percentage 
of those minorities in the private programs duplicatPs their percentage in 
the population of New York City, the figurft! would still only show that 
50% of all methadone users are black or Hi::;panic compared to 36.3% of 
the citywide population. 
31 Respondents recognize, and the findings of the 
District Court establish, that TA's legitimate employ-
ment goals of safety and efficiency require the exclusion 
of all users of illegal narcotics, barbituates, and 
amphetamines, and of a majority of all methadone users. 
See supra, at n. 4; 6 and n.n. 9-10; 8 and n. 14; n. 28. 
The D1str1ct Court also held that those goals require the 
exclusion of all methadone users from the 25% of its 
positions that are 11 Safety sensitive ... See ante, at 9. 
Finally, the District Court noted that those goals are 
significantly served by--even if they do not require--
TA's rule as it applies to all methadone users including 
those who are seeking employment in non-safety sensitive 
positions. See infra, at nn. 33, 37. The record thus 
demonstrates that TA 1 s rule bears a 11 manifest ·relationship 
to the employment in question." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 432. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
u.s. 405, 425. Whether or not respondents' weak showing 
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, it clearly 
failed to carry respondents' ultimate burden of proving 
a violation of Title VII. 
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announcPs a fundamental principle: the Rtate must govern 
impartially. General rules that apply evenhandedly to all 
persons within the jurisdiction unquestionably comply with 
this principle. Only when a governmental unit adopts a rule 
that has a special impact on less than all the persons subject 
to its jurisdiction does the question whether this principle is 
violated arise. 
In this case. TA's Rule 11 (b) places a meaningful restric-
tion on all of its employees and job applicants; in that sense 
the rule is one of general applicability and satisfies the equal 
protection principle without further inquiry. The District 
Oourt, however, interpreted the rule as applicable to the 
limited class of persons who regularly use narcotic drugs, 
including methadone. As so interpreted, we are necessarily 
. confronted with the question whether the rule reflects an 
impermissible bias against a special class. 
Respondents have never questioned the validity of a special 
rule for all users of narcotics. Rather, they originally con-
tended that persons receiving methadone should not be 
covered by that rule; in other words, they should not be 
included within a class that is otherwise unobjectionable. 
Their constitutional claim was that methadone users are 
entitled to be treated like most other employees and appli-
cants rather than like other users of narcotics. But the 
District Court's findings unequivocally establish that there 
are relevant differences between persons using methadone 
regularly and persons who use no narcotics of any kind.32 
a2 The District Court. found that methadone iR a narcotic. See 399 F. 
Supp., at 1038. See abo id., at 1044 ("The evidence is that, during the 
t1me patients are being brought up to their constant dosage of methadone 
(a prnod of about six weeks), there may be complaints of drowsiness, 
insomnia, exce~s ;;weatmg, constipation, and perhaps some other symp-
toms.'' ) . :\Iorrover, every member of the cla:>s of methadone users was 
formerly addicted to the usc of heroin . None is completely cured; other-
wise, there wuuld he no contmuing nred for treatment. All require some 
measure of :.pcc1al supervision, and all muRt structure their weeKly 
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Respondents no longer question the need. or at least the 
justification, for special rules for methadone users. Indeed, 
they vigorously defend the District Court's opinion which 
expressly held that it woulclbe permissible for TA to have a 
·special rule denying methadone users any employment unless 
they had been undergoing treatment for at least a year, and 
another special rule denying even the most senior and reliable 
methadone users any of the more dangerous jobs in the 
'System. 
The constitutional defect in TA's employment policies, 
according to the District Court, is not that· TA ·has special 
rules for methadone users. but rather that some members of 
the class should have been exempted from souve requirements 
of the special rules. Left intact by its holding are rules 
requiring special supervision of methadone users to detect 
evidence of drug abuse. ana excluding them from high-risk 
employment. Acceptin·g those rules, the District Court none-
theless concluded that employment in nonsensitive jobs could 
not be denied to methadone users who had progressed satis-
factorily with their treatment for one year. and who. when 
examined individually, satisfied TA's employment criteria. 
In short, having recognized that disparate treatment of meth-
adone users simply because they are methadone users is 
'routines around mandatory appearance~ at mrthadone clinics. The clinics 
make periodic checks as long as the treatment continues in order to detect 
evidence of drug abuse. Employers must rf>vif>w, ai1d sometimes verify, 
these checks; since the record indicate;: that the information supplied by 
trratment centers i~ not. uniformally reliable, see n. 7, supm. the employer 
has a special and continuing re:>ponsibility to review the condition of these 
persons. 
In addition, a sub~tantial pf>rcentage of per~onR taking methadone will 
not succe;;sfully complete the treatment program. The findings do not 
indicate with any prcciHiou the number who drop out, or the number who 
can fairly be classified aR unemployable, but t lw Pviclence indica teJS that it 
may wf>ll be a majority of tho::;e taking methadone ut uny given time. See l'#?nnd ,,~P>U. 
zq 
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permissible-and having excused TA from an acro~s-the-board 
requirement of individual con~jderation of such persons--the 
District Court construed , the Equal Protection Clause . as 
requiring T A to -adopt additional and more-- precise special 
rules for that special class. 
But any special rule short of total exchisio11 that ·TA might 
adopt is likely to be less precise-and will assuredly be more 
costly ~ 8-than the one that it currently enforces. If eligibil-
33 The District Court identified several significant screening procedures 
that TA would have to adopt specially for methadone users if it aban-
doned its rule. For example, the court notf'd that current methadone users 
(but no other applicants) would have to: 
"demonstrate that they have been on a reliaLle methadone program for 
a year or more; that they have faithfully abided b~· the rules of the pro-
gram; [and] that, according to ,;y~;tematic tests and observatiqns, they 
havo been free of any illicit drug or alcohol abu:se for the entire period 
of treatment excluding a possibJ,e <idjustmt•nt period .... " 399 F . Supp., 
at 1049. 
The District Court also recognized that verifying the above demon-
strations by the methadpllfi user would require Hpecial efforts to obtain 
reliable information from, and about, each of the many different metha-
done maintenance clinics-a task that it recognized · could be problematic 
in some cases. a99 F. Supp., at 1050, see ante, at n . 7. Furthermore, 
once it hired a methadone u:ser, TA would have a continuing d11ty to 
monitor his progre~;s in the maintenance program and would have to take 
spec1al precautions against his promotion to any of the safety-sen~;itive 
positions from which the District Court held he may be excluded. 
The dissent is therefore repeatedly mistaken in attributing to the Dis-
trict Court a finding that TA's "normal :screening process without addi-
tional effort" would suffice in the ab~:~ence of the "no drug8~' rule. /d., at 
9 n. 10. See id., at 5, 9. Aggravating this erroneous factual assumption 
.b a mistaken legal propo:sition advancrd by the dissent-that TA can be 
faulted for failing to prove the unemployability of "successfully main-
tained methadonr u:>ers." I d., at 6-7. A::;ide from the misallocation of 
the burden of proof that underlies this argument, it is important to note, 
see id., at 7, that TA did prove that 20 to 30% of the cia ·s afforded relief 
by the District Court are not "successfully maintained/' and hence are 
aRsuredly not employable. Even as::;uming therefore that the percentage 
of employable persons ·in the remaining 70% is 1he _tsame as that in the 
.: '•' 
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· ity is marked at any intermediate point-whether after one 
year of treatment or la.ter-the classification will inevitably 
discriminate between employees or applicants equally or 
almost equally apt to achieve full recovery.34 Even the Dis-
trict Court's opinion did not rigidly specify one year as a con-
stitutionally mandated measure of the period of treatment 
that guarantees full recovery from drug addiction.a" The 
uncertainties associated with the rehabilitation of heroin 
addicts precluded it from identifying any bright line marking 
the point at which the risk of regression ends. 311 By contrast, 
the "no drugs" policy now enforced by T A is supported by 
the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program 
(or other drug use) continues, a degree of uncertainty per-
sists.37 Accordingly, an employment policy that postpones 
cla~>s of TA applicants who do not use methadone, it is respondents who~ 
must be faulted for failing to prove that the offending 30% could be 
excluded a!:i cheaply and effectivrly in the ab~ence of the rule. 
:H It may well be, in fact , that many methadone usrrs who have been in 
programs for something less than a year are actually more qualified for 
employment than many others who have been in a program for longer 
than a year. 
3" "The TA is not prevented from making reasonable rules and regula-
tions about methadon~ maintained persons-such as requiring satisfactory 
performance in a program for a period of time such as a year . . .. " 
399 F. Supp., at 1058. 
30 These uncertainties are evident not only in the District Court's find-
ings but also in legislatiYe consideration of the problem. See Marshall v. 
United States, 414 U. S. 417, ·125-427. 
ar The completion of the program alHo marks the point at which the 
employee or applicant considers himself cured of drug dependence. More-
over, it is the point at which the employee/ applicant no longer must make 
regular visits to a methadone clinic, no longrr has access to free metha-
done that might be hoarded and taken m rxrr~sive and physically dis-
ruptive doses, and at which a simple urme test-as opposed to a urine test 
followed up by efforts to verify the bona fides of the subject's participa-
tion in a methadone program, and of the program itself-suffices to prove 
compliance with T A's rules. 
Respondents argue that the validity of these considerations is belied by 
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eligibility until the treatment program has been completed, 
rather than accepting an intermediate point on an uncertain 
line, is rational. It is neither unprincipled nor invidious in 
the sense that it implies disrespect for the excluded subclass. 
At its simplest, the District ~Court's conclusion was that 
TA's rule is broader than necessary to exclude those meth-
adone users who are not actuaJly qualified to work for··TA. 
We may assume not only that this conclusion is correct but also 
that it is probably unwise for a la.rge employer like TA to rely 
on a general rule instead of individualized consideration of 
every job applicant. But these assumptions concern matteFS 
of personnel policy that do not implicate the principle safe-
guarded by the Equal Protection Clause.~8 As the District 
Court recognized, the special classification created by TA's 
rule serves the general objectives of safety and efficiency.~~ 
TA's treatment of alcoholics. Although TA refuses to hire new employees 
with drinking problems, it continues in its employ a large number <'>f 
persons who have either been found ·drinking on the job or have been 
doomed unfit for duty because of prior drinking. 111ese situations give 
ris6 to discipline but are handled on an individual· basi:>. But the fltct 
· that T A has the resources to expend on one class of problem employees 
does not by itself establish a constitutional · duty on its part to come up 
with resources to spend on all classes of problem employees. 
aR The District Court also concluded that TA's rule violates the Due 
Proces::; Clause because it creates an "irrebutable presumption" of unem-
ployability on th!' part of methadone users. :399 F: Supp., at 1057. Re-
spondents do not rely on the due process argum!'nt: in this Court, and 
we find no merit in it. 
31' "[L]egislativ!' classification;.; ·are valid unl!'R::; they b!'ar no rational· 
relationship to the State's objectives. M 01!Sachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, [427 U.S. 307, 314]. State legislation 'does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause merely becaus!' the classifications [it makes] are imper-
fect.' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485." W01!hington v. 
Yakima Indian Nation, - U. S. -, - (slip op., at 38). See alsQo 
Vance v. Bradley, - U. S. -, -, quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v. 
Dumas School District, 361 U. S. 376, 385. ("Even if the classification 
involved here is to some !'Xtent both under- and overinclusiv!', and hence 
the line drawn by Congres::; imperfect, it i;; neverthelt>s::; the rule that h,1 ,a1 
· fl_as(l like this 'verfection is by no m!'ans required.' ~·) .. · 
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Moreover, the exclusionary line challenged by respondents "is 
not one which is directed 'against' any individual or category 
of persons, but rather it represents a policy choice . . . made 
by that branch of Government vested with the power to make 
such choices." Marshall v. 'United States, 414' U.S. 417, 428. 
Because it does not circumscribe a class of persons character-
ized by some unpopular trait or affiliation, it does not create 
or reflect any special likelihood of bias on the part of the 
ruling majority.40 Under these circumstances, it is of no 
constitutional significance that the degree of rationality is not 
a.s great with respect to certain ill-defined stibpa.rts of the 
classification as it is with respect to the classification as a. 
whole. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 83-84.41 
40 Since Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, the Courf:s equal protection 
cases have recognized a distinction between "invidious discrimination/1 
id., at 31-i. e., classifications drawn 1'with an evil eye and an unequaJ 
hand" or motivated by "a feeling ot antipathy 1' against, a specific group \ 
of residents, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373-374; Soon Hing v. 
Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710; see also Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 
59; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398-and those special rules that "are 
often necessary for general benefit;; [such us] supplying water, preventing 
fires, lightir>g streets, opening parks, and many other objects.'1 Barbier. 
supra, 113 U.S., at 31. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-
241. Quite plainly, TA's Rule 11 (b) was motivated by TA's interest in 
operating a safe and efficient transportation system rather than by any 
special animus again;;t a specific group of per:sons. Cf. 4l4 F. Supp., at 
279. Respondents recognize this valid general motivation, as did the Dis-
trict Court, and for that reason neither challenges TA's rule as it applies 
to all narcotic users, or even to all methadone users. Because respondents 
merely challenge the rule insofar as it applie:; to some methadone users, 
that challenge does not even raise the question whether the rule falls on 
the ·'invidiout>" side of the Barbier di;;tinction. Accordingly, there i:s noth-
ing to give rise to a presumption of illegality and to warrant our especially 
"att entive judgm<:'nt." Cf. 'l'ruax v. Corrigan, 257 LT. S. 312, 327. 
4 1 ·'Whrn a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts there may 
be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other ex-
tremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drnwn, or gradually 
picked out by successive decision:;, to mark where thr change takes place. 
Looked at by itself wW10ut regard to the necessity behind it the llne Pf 
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No matter how unwise it may be for TA to refuse employ-
ment to indi,vidual 'ca.r cleaners, track repairmen, or bus 
drivers simply. because. they are receiving methadone treat-
ment, the Constitution does not authorize a Federa1 Court -to 
interfere in that policy decision. ·' The judgment Of the Court 
of ,Appeals .is 
· Rever8ed. 
point .::eems arbitrary, It might as welT or nearly as well be a little more 
to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there 
must be, and that there is no mathematiral or logical way of fixing it pre-
ri'sely, tt1e decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say 
that it is very widP of any reasonable mark." Louisrille Ga.~ CO!. \!. Col(}-
IJWI.'I,, zn u. S. :32, 41 (HolnleS, .r ., dissenting-). 
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DRAFT OPINION 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
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RE: New York · City · Transit · Authority v. Beazer, No. 77-1427 
DATE: March 1, 1979 
Mr~ Justice Powell, concurring and dissenting. 
To the extent the Court determines the validity of the 
Transit Authority's rule barring present methadone users from 
employment, I concur in its judgment that the rule, so limited, 
does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I 
cannot agree, however, that the Transit Authority's rule is 
limited in the manner described. The record and the opinions 
of the courts below make clear that the Transit Authority also 
will not employ persons who are currently free of methadone use 
but who used the drug within at least the previous five years. 
To the extent the Transit Authority refuses to consider for 
employment persons currently free of methadone addiction, I 
~~ 
believe i ~ violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Second Circuit understood that the Transit 
Authority's rule constituted a "blanket exclusion from 
employment of all persons participating in or having 
2. 
successfully completed methadone maintenance programs." 558 
F.2d 97, 99 (1977). The District Court was unsure as to 
whether all past users were excluded, but did indicate that the 
policy extended at least to persons who had been free of 
methadone use tor less than five years. 399 F. Supp. 1032, 
1036 (1975). In light of petitioners' ~ 1 admission of the 
fact, Brief for Petitioners 5, the conclusion seems inescapable 
that the Transit Authority's policy barred employment of at 
least those users who had undergone methadone treatment within 
1 
the preceding five years. 
J' 4-~=~ /AcA., ~~ ~~ 
.-\ rfhe ~ ~Auefl.eriey's policy~ not impermissibly 
interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or operate 
2 
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. Accordingly, 
to constitute a denial of equal protection it must fail to 
satisfy the rational-basis standard of scrutiny our decisions 
have applied. See Vance v. Bradley, u.s. (1979); 
Massachusetts Bd~ of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 
(1976); San Antonio Ind~ · Schoo!, · Dist~ v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973); But this 
" inquiry, althugh relaxed, is not empty. We still must 
" 
determine ~hether the challenged distinction rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." 
roJ· J...- I ~~ v. Royster, 410 u.s. 263, 270 (1973) ;_J 
~~--
;w- fYV'· -•~ I uJ 
/1-~ ~~' ~- . ..vtY 
~IP-~~~v 
3. 
Applying the rational-basis standard to the facts 
found by the District Court, it must be concluded that the 
categorical exclusion from employment of all persons who have 
used methadone in the preceding five years, but who currently 
are free of drug use, does not satisfy the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The Court appears to imply as much, 
as it observes that "an employment policy that postpones 
eligibility until the treatment program has been completed, 
rather than accepting an intermediate point on an uncertain 
line, is rational." ~,at 22. See id., at n. 37. In 
contrast, a policy that postpones eligibility until five years 
after treatment has ended, as does petitioners', can be 
regarded on this record only as a means of punishing past 
methadone users. Because employability, and not punishment, is 
the articulated purpose of the Transit Authority's distinction, 
I would hold that petitioners have violated the Constitution to 
the extent they have refused to hire past methadone users who 
currently are free of drug use. 
PBS-3/2/79 
n. 3. Frasier, one of the named plainti this class 
action, had recently terminated methadone use at -
applied for a job as a bus cleaner. The District Cour 
as a fact that Frasier "was rejected because of his former 
methadone use," 399 F. Supp. 1032, · · (SDNY 1975), and the 
TJ,.,.-. ~~~ flll;ttt/.L~W ~ 
Court of Appeals did not reject this finding. A Unlike the 
~ 
Court, ante, at 7 n. 12, I would neither overturn ~ factual 
determination by two lower courts nor attempt sua sponte to 
t. y-~t.~ ~ ~ -!::!~~ .... «-_} 
reassess Frasier's fitness represent~ class of former 
users. In light of the Transit Authority's conceded policy of 
not employing former as well as present methadone users, 
vT-~ tr..~.,~~-·~ ~ 
A Frasier sid R~ Reed to engage in the futile ritual of 
reapplying for employment at periodic intervals in order to 
have standing to assert for purposes of equitable relief the 
rights of those who had been free of drug use for longer 
periods. 
2. For the reasons stated by the Court in Part II of 
its opinion, I do not believe respondents established a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even 
FN 2. 
when the full scope of the Transit Authority's policy is taken 
into account. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
The opinion of the Court addresses, and 
sustains, the policy of the Transit Authority under its 
Rule ll(b) only insofar as it is applied to employees 
and applicants for employment who "are receiving 
methadone treatments" (emphasis supplied). Ante, at 3, 
n.3, and 24. I concur in the opinion of the Court 
holding that there is no violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's 
policy is applied to employees or applicants who are 
currently on methadone .M I 
~Two of the respondents are former employees of TA who 
were dismissed while on methadone treatment. The other 
two were refused employment, one while he was taking 
methadone and the other after the ~onclusion 
of his methadone treatment. See ante, at 6,7~ 
2. 
But in my view the case presented by the 
record and opinions of the Courts below is not limited 
to the effect of the rule on present methadone users. 
CAV\~ 
Indeed, I have thought it ~ecoinize~by all concerned 
that the Transit Authority's policy of exclusion 
c.-- ~r~J. 
~~ended to persons currently free of methadone use ~ 
who had been on the drug within the previous five 
years. The District Court was unsure as to whether all 
past users were excluded but indicated that the policy 
~~xcXtis±on extended at least to persons who had been 
free of methadone use for less than five years. 399 F. 
1-
Sup. 1032, 1036 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit was unequivocal. It understood that the 
rule as-a~p-l±ed- constituted a "blanket exclusion from 
employment of all persons participating in or having 
successfully completed methadone maintenance programs" 
':--
558 F.2d 97, 99 (1977). 
Petitioner~ brief in this Court states, in 
effect, that the Authority will only consider 
applicants for employment who have been free of a druq 
B,~s- ·. 
problem for "at least five years", (19o- 5): 
"[T]he Authority will give individual 
consideration to people with a past history of 
drug addiction including those who have 
completed either a drug free or a methadone 
maintenance program, and who have been 
completely druq free and have had a stable 
hi story for at least five years. ·' ( R. tr. 
1/2 8/7 5, pp. 7 0 9 , 714 , 715 ) • >I '3 V\1 <1.~ ~ (~C:t~ S , 
There was a similar recognition of the Authority's 
policy in the petition for a writ of certiorari.} 
~In the P~titione~ Statement of the Case the affected 
class was said to include former addicts "who are 
participants in or have completed a methadone 
maintenance program". Petition vaot 4 (emphasis 
supplied). ~ ~~ 
The brief for respondents similarly described 
the Transit Authority's policy: 
"The Transit Authority's blanket denial of 
employment to fully rehabilitated heroin 
addicts who are being or ever have been 
treated in methadone maintance programs 
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Respondenttt s -srt-e:f 59. 
3. 
4. 
Despite this unanimity among the parties and 
courts below as to the case presented, the Court today 
simply chooses to consider and decide the validity of 
the Authority's policy with respect to employees and 
applicants currently receiving methadone treatment. 
The explanation given for thus limitinq its decision is 
that "neither the findings of fact nor the record 
evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to 
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose 
k ..l->71W. ~~ --\\. ~ VU-<'.J ) 
of this litigation". Ante at 2-;r- 3, n. 3. 
--... ~~) 
-tk lu.;.~ .~-\- ~* ~ ~ ~ ~) ~ ~"-c..<MMAh~ 




nat e d .aoo-v-e----
W) ~~JA.,' 
~fte--pereepH-Gn-s-O-f-tbe parties and the. -eon r t s 
)fThe Court's incomplete reference to the opinion and 
findings of the District Court, ante at 3, n. 3, omits 
entirely the finding of that court: 
"Plaintiff Beazer is such a person [one who 
had successfully withdrawn from methadone], 
having ceased using methadone almost two years 
ago •••• There is no rational reason for 
maintaining an absolute bar against the 
employment of these persons regardless of 
their individual merit." Pet. for Cert., App. 
5la. 
1· The District Court also noted that the Authority 
"contends that it cannot afford to take what it 
considers the risks of employing present or past 
methadone maintained persons, except possibily those 
who have been successfully withdrawn from methadone for 
several years." Pet., App. 54a. (emphasis supplied). 
5. 
I conclude that the Court has decided only a 
portion of the case presented, and has failed to 
address what it recognizes as the more difficult issue. 
~ J..'2. ,. " ."'>1 
~' at2~, n. 3, We owe it to the parties to resolve 
all issues properly presented, rather than afford no 
guidance whatever as to whether former drug and 
methadone users may be excluded from employment by the 
Authority. I agree with the courts below that there is 
no rational basis for an absolute bar against the 
employment of persons who have completed successfully a 
methadone maintenance program and who otherwise are 
qualified for employment. I think the exclusion of all 
such persons is an irrational and discriminatory 
classification, and one that does not further a 
legitimate state interest. (Cite authorities). I 
therefore would affirm the judgment below with respect 
to the class of persons represented by respondent 
Beazer. 
lfo/ss 3/3/79 
77-1427 N.Y. City Trarysit v. Beazer 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
The opinion of the Court addresses, and 
sustains, the policy of the Transit Authority under its 
Rule ll(b) only insofar as it is applied to employees 
and applicants for employment who "are receiving 
methadone treatments" (emphasis supplied). Ante, at 3, 
n.3, and 24. I concur in the opinion of the Court 
holding that there is no violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's 
policy is applied to employees or applicants who are 
currently on methadone.* 
*Two of . the respondents are former employees of TA who 
were dismissed while on methadone treatment. The other 
two were refused employment, one while he was taking 
methadone and the other after the successful conclusion 
of his methadone treatment. See ante, at 6,7. 
But in my view the case presented by the 
record and opinions of the Courts below is not limited 
to the effect of the rule on present methadone users. 
Indeed, I have thought it recognized by all concerned 
that the Transit Authority's policy of exclusion 
extended to persons currently free of methadone use but 
who had been on the drug within the previous five 
years. The District Court was unsure as to whether all 
past users were excluded but indicated that the policy 
of exclusion extended at least to persons who had been 
free of methadone use for less than five years. 399 F. 
Sup. 1032, 1036 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit was unequivocal. It understood that the 
rule as applied constituted a "blanket exclusion from 
employment of all persons participating in or having 
successfully completed methadone maintenance programs" 
558 F.2d 97, 99 (1977). 
Petitioner's brief in this Court states, in 
effect, that the Authority will only consider 
applicants for employment who have been free of a druq 
problem for "at least five years" (p. 5): 
"[T]he Authority will give individual 
consideration to people with a past history of 
drug addiction including those who have 
2. 
completed either a drug free or a 
maintenance program, and who have 
completely drug free and have had 
history for at least five years. 





There was a similar recognition of the Authority's 
policy in the petition for a writ of certiorari.* 
*In the Petitioner's Statement of the Case the affected 
class was said to include former addicts "who are 
participants in or have ~ comp!eted a methadone 
maintenance program". Petition at 4 (emphasis 
supplied). 
The brief for respondents similarly described 
the Transit Authority's policy: 
"The Transit Authority's blanket denial of 
employment to fully rehabilitated heroin 
addicts who are being or ever have been 
treated in methadone maintance programs 
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Respondent's Brief 59. 
3. 
4. 
Despite this unanimity among the parties and 
courts below as to the case presented, the Court today 
simply chooses to consider and decide the validity of 
the Authority's policy with respect to employees and 
applicants currently receiving methadone treatment. 
The explanation given for thus limiting its decision is 
that "neither the findings of fact nor the record 
evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to 
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose 
of this litigation". Ante at 2, 3, n. 3. This reading 
of the record is quite contrary - as I have noted above -
to the perceptions of the parties and the courts 
below.* 
*The Court's incomplete reference to the opinion and 
findings of the District Court, ante at 3, n. 3, omits 
entirely the finding of that court: 
"Plaintiff Beazer is such a person [one who 
had successfully withdrawn from methadone], 
having ceased using methadone almost two years 
ago •••• There is no rational reason for 
maintaining an absolute bar against the 
employment of these persons regardless of 
their individual merit." Pet. for Cert., App. 
Sla. 
The District Court also noted that the Authority 
"contends that it cannot afford to take what it 
considers the risks of employing present ~r. Rast 
methadone maintained persons, except possibily those 
who have been successfully withdrawn from methadone for 
several years." Pet., App. 54a. (emphasis supplied). 
5. 
I conclude that the Court has decided only a 
portion of the case presented, and has failed to 
address what it recognizes as the more difficult issue. 
Ante, at 3, n. 3. We owe it to the parties to resolve 
all issues properly presented, rather than afford no 
guidance whatever as to whether former drug and 
methadone users may be excluded from employment by the 
Authority. I agree with the courts below that there is 
no rational basis for an absolute bar against the 
employment of persons who have completed successfully a 
methadone maintenance program and who otherwise are 
qualified for employment. I think the exclusion of all 
such persons is an irrational and discriminatory 
classification, and one that does not further a 
legitimate state interest. (Cite authorities). I 
therefore would affirm the judgment below with respect 
to the class of persons represented by respondent 
Beazer. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
The opinion of the Court addresses, and 
sustains, the policy of the Transit Authority under its 
Rule ll(b) only insofar as it is applied to employees 
and applicants for employment who "are · receiving 
methadone treatments" (emphasis supplied). Ante, at 3, 
n.3, and 24. I concur in the opinion of the Court 
holding that there is no violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's 
policy is applied to employees or applicants who are 
currently on methadone.* 
*Two of the respondents are former employees of TA who 
were dismissed while on methadone treatment. The other 
two were refused employment, one while he was taking 
methadone and the other after the successful conclusion 
of his methadone treatment. See~' at 6,7. 
But in my view the case presented by the 
record and opinions of the Courts below is not limited 
to the effect of the rule on present methadone users. 
Indeed, I have thought it recognized by all concerned 
that the Transit Authority's policy of exclusion 
extended to persons currently free of methadone use but 
who had been on the drug within the previous five 
years. The District Court was unsure as to whether all 
past users were excluded but indicated that the policy 
of exclusion extended at least to persons who had been 
free of methadone use for less than five years. 399 F. 
Sup. 1032, 1036 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit was unequivocal. It understood that the 
rule as applied constituted a "blanket exclusion from 
employment of all persons participating in or having 
successfully completed methadone maintenance programs" 
558 F.2d 97, 99 (1977). 
__::. 
~ Th±S-vleW of the Authority's policy was 
-
l:nfirmed here in the brief filed on behalf of 
I 
~~ 
"[T]he Authority will give individual 
consideration to people with a past history 
drug addiction including those who have 
completed either a drug free or a methadone 
maintenance program, and who have been 




history for at least five years. 
1/28/75, pp. 709, 714, 715). 
(R. tr. 
There was a similar recognition of the Authority's 
policy in the petition for a writ of certiorari.* 
*In the-Petitioner's Statement of the Case the affected 
class was said to include former addicts "who are 
participants in or have cqmplet~d a methadone 
maintenance program". Petition at 4 (emphasis 
supplied). 
The brief for respondents similarly described 
the Transit Authority's policy: 
"The Transit Authority's blanket denial of 
employment to fully rehabilitated heroin · 
addicts who are being or ever have been 
treated in methadone maintance programs 
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Respondent's Brief 59. 
3. 
4. 
Despite this unanimity among the parties and 
courts below as to the case presented, the Court today 
simply chooses to consider and decide the validity of 
~~ 
the Authority's policy with respect to applicants 
I\ 
currently receiving methadone treatment. The 
explanation given for thus limiting its decision is 
that "neither the findings of fact nor the record 
evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to 
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose 
of this litigation". Ante at 2, 3, n. 3. This readinq 
of the record is quite contrary - as I have noted above -
to the perceptions of the parties and the courts 
below.* 
*The Courtrs incomplete reference to the opinion and 
findings of the District Court, ante at 3, n. 3, omits 
entirely the finding of that court: 
"Plaintiff Beazer is such a person [one who 
had successfully withdrawn from methadone], 
having ceased using methadone almost two years 
ago •••• There is no rational reason for 
maintaining an absolute bar against the 
employment of these persons regardless of 
their individual merit." Pet. for Cert., App. 
Sla. 
The District Court also noted that the Authority 
"contends that it cannot afford to take what it 
considers the risks of employing present or 2ast 
methadone maintained persons, except possibily those 
who have been successfully withdrawn from methadone for 
several years." Pet., App. 54a. (emphasis supplied). 
I conclude that the Court has decided only a 
portion of the case presented, and has failed to 
address what it recognizes as the more difficult issue. 
~' at 3, n. 3. We owe it to the parties to resolve 
all issues properly presented, rather than afford no 
~~ 
guidance whatever as to whether former methadone users 
'\ 
may be excluded f~om employment by the Authority. I 
agree with the courts below that there is no rational 
basis for an absolute bar against the employment of 
persons who have completed successfully a methadone 
maintenance program and who otherwise are qualified for 
employment. 
~ 
I think the exclusion of such persons is 
1\ 
an irrational and discriminatory classification, and 
one that does not further a legitimate state interest. 
5. 
~~~ 
(Cite authorities). I therefore would affirmAwith 
respect to the class of persons represented by 
respondent Beazer. 
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New York City Transit Authority) On \Vrit of Certiorari to 
et al.. Petitioners, the l:"nited States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Sec-
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MH. Juti'rrcE PowELJ.,, concurnng in part and. dissenting in 
part. 
The opinion of the Court addresses. and sustains, the policy 
of the Transit Authority under its Rule 11 (b) only insofar 
as it applies to employees and applicants for employment 
who "are receiving methado11e treatments" (emphasis sup-
plied). Ante, at 3 n. 3. and 24. I concur ill the opinion of 
thr Court holding that there is no violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's policy 
is applied to employe<'s or applica11ts who are currently on 
methadone. 
But i11 my view the question presented by the record and 
opinions of the courts below is not limited to thP effect of the 
rule on present methadone users. Indeed, 1 have thought it 
conceded by all concemed that the Transit Authority's policy 
of exclusiou extended bryond the literal language of Rule 
11 (b) to persons currPntly fre(' of lllethadone use but who 
had beeu on the drug within the prt>vious five years. The 
D1strict Court vvas unsllrc' wlwther all past users were excluded 
but indicated that the policy of exclusion covered at least 
twrsons who had been free of methadone use for less than five 
vears. 3D~l F ~upp 1032, 1036 (1975) .' The Court of 
1 Tlw Di~tnct Co11rt al~o uotrd that th(• Authority "contends that it 
c·nnJJOt atl"ord to takr what It c·on~Jc!Pr~ thr riHk~ of rmployiug p1"eseut Ol' 
pu81 mrt ha<loll(' ma 1n t mned wr~ons, exrrpt poH~ihly t ho::;r who have been 
'· 
77-1427-CONCUR & DISSENT 
2 NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. B:EAZER 
Appeals for the Second Circuit was unequivocal. It under-
stood that the rule constituted a "blanket exclusion from 
employment of all persons participating in or having success-
fully completed methadone maintenance programs.'' 558 F. 
2d 97, 99 (1977) . 
Petitioners' brief in this Court states, in effect, that the 
Authority will consider only applicants for employment who 
have been free of a drug problem for "at least five years" : 
" rT]he Authority will give individual consideration to 
people with a past history of drug addiction including 
those who have completed either a drug free or a metha-
done maintenance program, and who have been com-
pletely drug free and have had a stable history for at least 
five years. (R. tr. l / 28/75, pp. 709, 714, 715)." Brief 
for Petitioners 5. 
There was a similar recognition of the Authority 's policy in 
the petition for a writ of certiorari.~ 
Despite this unanimity among th~ parties and courts below 
as to the question presented, the Court today simply chooses 
to limit its decision to the policy with respect to employees 
and applicants currently receiving methadone treatment. The 
explanation given is that "neither the findings of fact nor the 
record evidencC' squarely presents any issue with respect to 
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose of this 
::;uccrssfuJJ:v withdrawn from mrthadonP for ~Pveral year;;. " agg F . Snpp. 
1032, 1052 (SDNY 1975) trmpha::n~ ::;upplird) . 
2 In peiitioner~ ' Statrment of the Ca::;r thr affrctrd class was said to 
include former add1ctH "who ru·r part1eipani::; in or have completed a 
methadon(' maintrnanrP program ." PP1. for Crrt. 4 (empha:;J::; HUpplied) . 
Thr bm'f for rr~pondrnts Hlmilarly clPHrribcd thr Tran~Jt . Authority's· 
pohc~' · 
''The Tramnt Authont~,·~ blanket dE>nHd of employmPnt to fully rPhab1li-· 
tatc•d herolll addirts who an• bemg or pver haw bc•eu trcatrd in metha-
don<> maintenn nr<> program~ vwlate~ t lw Equal Protect 1011 and Dur Proces~· 
Cl m,tse~ of lhP ~'ourternth Ammcllncnt " Brief fur He~pouclent~. 
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litigation." Ante, at 2--3. n. 3. In light of the findings and 
decision of the courts below, and petitioners' concessions, this 
limitation seems unj ustifiable.'l 
I conclude that the· Court has dPcided only a portion of the 
case presentf'd, and has failed to address what it recognizes as 
the more difficult issur. A nle, at 2-3. n. 3. 22, and n. 37. We 
owe it to the parties to resolve all issues properly presented, 
rather than to afford no guidance whatever as to whether 
former drug and methadonf' users may be excluded from 
employuwnt by the Authority. I agree with the courts below 
that there is no rational basis for an absolute bar against the 
emploympnt of persons who have completed successfully a 
rnethadonf' maintenance program and who otherwise are 
qualified for employment. See Vance v. Bradley, - U. S. 
-,- (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 
427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. 
''The Court :>erw~ to imp]~· that Lrcausc the Transit Autborit~·'s policy 
with respE'ct to formrr mrthadmw ttHE'r~ had not bc<·n invoked again~! any 
of the named plailltitl's, it wa~ 1mproper for the District Comt to crrtify 
a rlaHs of former u~C'I'~ who would be affected by the polic~·. Ante. at 2-3, 
n. a, 7 ll. 12. Putt in~~: a~JdP whet her it i~ proper for thi~ Comt to dis-
regard the Di;otrlf'l Court'~ explicit finding that plaintiff Frasier "was 
rejrcted Ll'rau~e of hi~ fon/11:' '1' m<'lhaclon<· use," :399 F . Supp., at 1034 
( ('mpha::;i::; :mpplird), the Court owrlook the finding that : 1 
f>. II 
' '[I Jt 1s unquestwned that dtt•re are many methadone maintenance patients 
who ~ucrE'~,full~· withdraw from methadonC' and :stay clear of drug abuse 
therE'after. PlamtJfl' Bt>uzcr i~ Huch a. per~un, having ceased using metl1a-
donc almo~t two years ago. . . There is no rational reason for maintain-
ing an absolutP bar agnin~t thr emplo~·ment of these prr ·ons regardless 
of their mdiYidual mrrit ." !d., at 1051. 
H i~ ciPar that BPazPr both wa::< a prop<'r reprPsmtative of tlw class of 
former u~er:-; and wa::; mtPrC'St<'d m Tran~1! Authurit~· Pmployment, inas-
much as rC'msta temt'nt wa,.; part of thl' rrlief lw sought. In light of thE' 
Tramll Authonty'" unrtpnvoral policy of not Pmploying persons in 
BPazer·~ po~ition , tt wn~ llll!H'<'e~~ary for him to <•ngage ill the futile ritual 
of rrappl~·mg for emplo~·mrtn aftt•r tPrmmating his mC'thadone usc in 
order to lwve "tanding to <t(taek tiH· polwy. 
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Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40 (1973).. I therefore would affirm 
the judgment below with respect to the class of persons wh~ 
are former methadone users: 
'l'o : ·rte Chief Justice 
Mr. Just i.e~ Brennan 
Mr . Justice Ste~art 
Mr. Just; ·~n Wnita 
~JJ Mr. Ju~t: ' 
;L•-.r·aha.ll 
Mr. Jus t1 r: ., :;1a.okmun 
Mr. Just i.,u R:•hnq'tl1 St 
Mr. Justice StGvens 
From: Kr. Justice Powell 
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New York City Transit AuthoritylOn '\Vrit of CPrtioral'i to 
Pt al. , Petitio11ers, thf' F nitRd StatE's Court 
v. of Appeals for the Sec· 
Carl A. Beazer et al. ond Circuit. 
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MR. JtrSTICE PowELL, concurri11g in part and dissenting in 
part. 
Thr opinion of tlw Court addrPSSE'S, and sustains, the policy 
of the Transit Authority undrr its Rule 11 (b) only · insofar 
as it applit>s to rmployees and applicants for Pmployment 
who "are receiving methadon e treatments" (emphasis sup-
pliPd) . Ante, at :3 n. 3. a11d 24. I concur in the opinion of 
the• Court holding that tlwre .is no violation of the Equal 
ProtPction Clause or Title VII when thP Authority's policy 
is applied to employ<'PS or applicants who arc currPntly on 
methadone. 
But in my viPw the qupstion J)ff'Sentf'd by the record and 
opinions of the courts bPlow is not limited to thf' eft'ect of the 
rule on present methadonE' users. Indeed. I havP thought it 
conceded by all coneC'med that the· Transit Authority's policy 
of exclusion extPndE'd beyond the literal languagE' of Rule 
11 (b) to persons curTf'ntly frf'E' of lllethadone use but who 
had bE>en on tlw drug; within the previous five years. Tlw 
District Court 'A'as unsure whE'thcr all past users were excluded 
but indicated that the policy of exclusion cow•red at least 
p<•rsons who had been frre of methadone use for less than five 
y<•ars. 3m) F :-iupp. 1032, 1036 (H)75).' The Court of 
I 1'Jw Di;;tnct Comt al;;o notPCI that tlu' Authonty " contend~ that 1t 
l'annot [lfford to takP what 1! consider~ the ri sk~ of employing present or 
pas~ metha<lonc ma\ntnmecl pen;oJIS , c•xrPpt JXlH;;ibl ' tho~r who have been 
77-1427-CONCUR & DISSENT 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit was unequivocal. It under-
stood that the rule constituted a "blanket exclusion from 
employment of all persons participating in or having success-
fully completed methadone maintenance programs." 558 F. 
2d 97. 99 (1977). 
Petitioners' brief in this Court states, in effect, that the 
Authority will consider only applicants for employment who 
have been free of a drug problem for "at least five years": 
"[T]he Authority will give individual consideration to 
people with a past history of drug addiction including 
those who have completed either a drug free or a metha-
done maintenance program. and who have been com-
pletely drug free and have had a stable history for at least 
five years. Brief for Petitioners 5. 
There was a similar recognition of the Authority 's policy in 
the petition for a writ of certiorari.~ 
Despite this unanimity among the parties and courts below 
as to the question presented. the Court today simply chooses 
to limit its decision to the policy with respect to employees 
and applicants currently receiving methadone treatment. The 
explanatiou given is that "neither the fiJl(lings of fact nor the 
record evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to 
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose of this 
litigatiou ." Ante, at 2-3, 11. 3. But tlw only support thE' \ 
,'ucccssfully w1thdmwn from mPthadonr for sevrral year:;." 399 F . Supp. 
1032, 1052 (SDNY 1975) (empha:;is :;upplied). 
2 l11 pPtitionPr~' Statrment of the Ca~r the affrctcd rla~s was said to 
include former addic·t~'< '· who arc participants in or have completed a 
methadone mamtenanc:c prop;ram." Pet. for Cert. 4 (empha:;i:; ~upplied). 
The brief for n•:;pondcnto: ~imilarly cle:-;cribed the Tran:;Jt Authority',; 
polic·~·. 
''The Tran:;it Authont~··s blanket denwl of employment to full~· rehubili-
latc·d heroin ncldicts who arP h~?ing or Pver have bPI?JJ treated in metha-
done maintenance programs violate:>~ lhl' Equal Protection and Due Pmces~ 
Clnu~e:; of the Foml<'rnth Auwndmenl." Brief for He:;pondents. 
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f4ourt ri L<'s for th i~ sta tc•tn<'n t is a lark of proof as Lo the 
policy's ad llR 1 appl iea t ion. f n light of th<• <'XJH'('i:iR adm is~ ion 
of tlw Tranr-:it .\uthority to tlw l)istriet Court that th<' poli('y 
extended to at l0ast som0 fornwr LIS('rs." <'vidPilC<' of tlw past 
application of the• poliey was irrel<'vant to the fashioning of 
pros p0et i vf' n· 1 ief.1 
I conclude that th0 rourt has d0cided only a portion of the 
case presented. and has failed to address what it recognizes as 
the morr difficult issue. A 11le, at 2- 3. 11. 3. 22, and n. 37. We 
O\H' it to the parties to n•solve all issues properly presE:>n tt>cl. 
rathN tha11 to afford no guidancr what<•vf'r as to "·lwtlwr 
former drug and methadonP usrrs may be excluded from 
employment by the Authority. I agree with tlw courts oelow 
that ther<' is no ratio1Ial basis for an absolut(' bar against the 
e>mploynwnt of p('rsons who haVC' eompll•ted successfully a 
3 ' ('(', 1'. (! .• :3 Com! of .\ppt•al~ .\pp. uona- lll2a. I 
1 Tht' ( 'our! ,;(•t ·m,, 1o irnpJ_,. thai IH•c·:tn,.t· the Tran,.il Authorit.1·',. polit•)' 
with r<'~ppr·l to forrn<•r· nwtlwdont• u,;c•r,; had not l1<·en invoked a~rnins1 <IllY 
of thf' nnmPd plnintiffs , it wa,; illl]li'OJlN for the Distriel Court to <'et1ify 
:1 elas,: of former tt,.rr" who would be alfc·c·t('(l by the' polic)· . Aute. Ht 2-:3, 
11 . :~, i 11. 1:2 . En•n if otlt ' wt·n• to <"OII~idl'r 11 pro]Wr for thi~ Court to 
tli,.n•g:ml th<· Di,;ITwi ( 'ourf · .~ r·xplieil finding that plain tift' Fra,cit'r .. wa" 
rrjectPd !wean~<· of hi,.- fonnel' mdhad01w nst• ,' ' :{99 F . ~upp. , at 10B4 
(<•mpha:<i~ "upplied) , tlw ( 'oml uvprlook" the• fmtlwr finding that : 
'·I Ill i,.; tllltf\l<'~fionrd that then• an• man)· nwfhadom· maintPnance pa1iPnt~:~ 
who ~nrct '""full~ · withdraw from methadone :mel ,.;1a)· <"iPar of dmg abuse 
lhNf'<tflc·r. l'lamtitr Hrazt•r i~ "ueh a p<'r,.on, having <'PHSPcl u"ing mP.tha-
donr almost two )"Par,; ago . . . . Tht•rr i:,; no rational n·a,.;:on for maintaiu-
ing- an nh~ohtt<' bar a~rain"l 1hP Pmploym<'nt of thPsE' JlN~on~ regardless 
of thPir individual mrril." !d., at 1051. 
lt i:< elc'ar that Heazc•r both was a proper rPpn•,.rntafive of 1hP ela:o..- of 
form r r ns<·r,; and wa" llllt•rPRf Pel in Tn1n~1t Ant l10rit )" <' lii]Jio)·mpnt , ina~­
mueh a" rpin,.faiPnWttt "'"" part of tiH' reliPf hr "ought. Ttl light of thC' 
TntnHit. Ani honl _, .·~ tllll'qnivoeal polic·)· of not c·mplo)·ing ppr,;on~ in 
BPazer':< po"ition , 1! wa~ umwc·Pi-<~ar)· for him to l'ngagt' itl t hP f11tilr rituaT 
of rrappl)·ing for c•mplo)·IIH'IIt aftc•r fNminating his mPthaclone use J.lb 
Qrder to han• :-:t<tiHling to aftac·k. tht• poltey. 
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mrthadonP main tPnaHce program and who othNwise are 
qualified for E'mploynwnt. Srr lla11ce v. Bradley, - F. H. 
-,- (1979l; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 1\!Iuryia, 
427 1 . R. 307. 314 (197o); &v11 Anto-nio Ind. &·hoot Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 r. :-;. 1. 40 (H.J73). I thereforE' would affirm 
the .iu<lguwnt below with respect to the cla:o:s of persons who 
are former methadone US{'rs. 
.§lt.prtntt QJourt of tqt ~lnittb ~mftrl' 
';JlllUlfrht!lton. ;IJ. QJ. 211,GJ!) 
CHAMI!!f:RS or-
THE CHIEF JUSTI CE 
March 13, 1979 




Mr. Justice Stevens 
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